R. 5. 28.

BOETHIUS

De

CONSOLATIONE,

ANGLO-LATINE,

Expressus,

Per S. [redacted]. E. M.

---

by Sr Edw: Spencer.

Londini Excusum, 1654.

BOETHIUS

De

CONSOLATIONE

PHILOSOPHIÆ.

Expedit.

TO THE
RIGHT HONORABLE
THOMAS,
Earle of
SOUTHAMPTON,
my very Learned and Noble friend,
and Allye.

My Lord,

IT were reason enough for a Dedication that I had knowne your Lordſhip in your tender yeares; for whoſoever hath knowne you at any time, muſt needs ho-

nour and love you, but hee that inwardly now knowes you (as I doe) must honour and admire you; and I have so many Titles to make mee honour you, that I have the greatest reason in the world to Dedicate my whole selfe unto you.

Be pleased to accept this peece, first, of my Boethius, whom I by many reasons may cal mine, having studied him at least these forty yeares, and used as many meanes and helps of Commentators and Interpreters as I could get, to make him wholly mine. At last, I found mine owne Genius made me the best Interpreter of him, which worke I now Dedicate to you, that if you please, my Lord, under your name to let it come to publike view, it may, if not, it may rest in silence.

I once saw and perused a translation of it into English, a very good one, Dedicated to my Lady your Mother, in manuscript, I wish I might come to the view of that againe; it is at least thirty yeares since I saw that: I have now sent your Lordship to peruse a good Translation of him in English Print, signed with G.G. but no

more

more of his name can I learne, or whether he be dead or alive; but I dare ſweare it was not GEORGE GARRARD, *whether hee bee ſo learned or no, I knowe not, but for all his modeſty if it had beene his, the world ſhould have taken more notice of his name, who publiſhed himſelfe* GEORGE GARRARD *the Bowler.*

My worke ſhall have the ſignatures of S. E. according to the faſhion of the Innes of Court which are the beſt Courts now.

HENRY *Earle of* SOUTHAMPTON *your renowned father,* tam Marte quam Mercurio, *was of Lincolns Inne, and hath left in that Chappell an everlaſting monument of his beneficence and Piety: the whole Roofe was his Timber, ſuch is not now to be had for a hundred pound.* FRANCIS *Earle of* RUTLAND, FRANCIS *Earle of* BEDFORD, FRANCIS *Earle of* WESTMORLAND, IOHN *Earle of* BRIDGEVVATER, *and his father* ELLESMERE, *who by his ſtudy there became great Chancellors and was for two dayes together Lord high* STEVVARD *of England.* GEORGE *Earle of* RUTLAND, *and I believe* IOHN *now Earle of* RUTLAND, FRANCIS *Earle of* CHICHES-

TER; your late father in law, was of Lincolnes Inne in my time, and his brother Mr. ROBERT LEIGH. The Lord VISCOVNT CRAMOND betetr knowne by the name Lord RICHARDSON, the first of them by his study there rayſed himselfe and family. The Lord MARQVES DORCHESTER, is now of Grayes Inne, a very learned Gentleman: and his Brother PIERPOINT is of Lincolnes Inne now also, a very learned Gentleman. And I, quoth the dog, may come in the reere of the Nobility to make one, who have beene a Dunce there, because I never gate mony by the Law, ever since 1612. now forty two yeares. I had almost forgotten my Brother Dunce, who neither got any money by the Law, but hee danced not there long Sir BEAVCHAMP Saint IOHNS, wee were admitted both in oue night. All these were of Lincolns Inne, Sir HENRY COMPTON also, and some more that I cannot now remember, and multitudes of other Inns of Court. But these are enough to make that Position good, there are now no such Courts in any place of England.

Yet

Yet I hope to make them more glorious when they are made Academies of Muſicke, and all the Muſicke of the world ſhall bee made Engliſh. A worke I have now in hand, and finde it very fezible, I have made ſome progreſſe in it. Then I hope my friends will not pronounce mee an abſolute Dunce in all things, though neither by this doe I intend to get money. I am in Love with God and goodneſſe and not with Mammon. Pereat Pecunia, male parta cum coacervatore ejus. Ergo Auguris votum teneo. Nec paupertatem nec divitias, ne in deſectum aut contemptum veniam ex pauperte, nec in ſuperbiam & obliviſcentiam Dei per accumulatas divitias.

This is enough if not too much for an Epiſtle; ſo now I take the boldneſſe to kiſſe your hands my Lord for a fare well, who have been long in kiſſing them by this Epiſtle. And I remaine

My Lord
Devoted to your farther ſervice
S. E. M.

12 *Sept.* 1654.

Collectarium primi Libri, compendiosa succinctaq; resumptio dictorum in libros Boethii de Consolatione Philosophiæ.

The gatherings of the first Book, being a compendious and succinct assumption of those things which are said in the Books of *Boethius.*

The first Book hath seven Meeters, and six Proses. In the first Meeter *Boethius* bewailes his misery, from the change of his Study, and in part from the decay of his body, and in part from the prolonging of his miserable life, speaks by Apostrophe against his friends.

Primus liber habet 7. Metra, & 6. Prosas. In Metro primo deplangit statum suæ miseriæ ex parte permutationis studii & ex parte defectus corporalis, & ex parte prolongationis suæ miserabilis vitæ Apostrophando contra amicos.

In Prosa prima introducit Philosophiam se super suam miseriam consolantem, & describit dispositiones & proprietates ejus, vestesq; tenues, quas practica & theoretica intertexta perornavit.

In the first Prose hee brings Philosophy comforting him against his miseries, and describeth the disposition and properties of her garments, which were thin, which the Practicall and Theoricke had interwoven and adorned her with.

In Metro 2. Philosophia deplangit perturbationem mentis hominis convertendo se specialiter super Boethium.

In the second Meeter, Philosophy bewails the perturbation of the mind of man, turnes her selfe especially to *Boethius*.

In prosa 2. Philosophia investigat morbum ex quibusdam signis consolando ipsum ne desperet.

In the second Prose Philosophy findes out the disease from some signs comforteth him lest he should despair.

In Metro 3. Boethius declarat per quibusdam se quomodo remotis impedimentis recuperat vigorem.

In the third Meeter *Boethius* declares by certain things how he, the impediments removed, may recover his vigor.

In Prosa 3. ostendit quomodo Philosophiam agnoverit & qualiter de præsentia ejus admirari cæpit, & quomodo sapienti persecutio a vulgaribus non est nova, sed cunctis præstantissimis viris communis.

In the third Prose hee sheweth how he knew Philosophy, and how hee admired her presence, and how persecution is a common thing from the vulgar, to the wisest and best men.

In Metro 4. Philosophia ostendit qualiter hoc de se habet ut persecutiones improbi non prævalent contra ipsum exclamando cunctos qui timent tyrannos, sibi nectunt catenam, qua trahantur.

In the fourth Meeter Philosophy sheweth how he hath it from her, that the persecutions of wicked men may not prevail, exclaimeth against him, that all that fear tyrants, knit a chain for themselves by which they are drawn.

In 4. Prosa Philosophia requirit Boethium super attentione præcedentium, & hortatur ipsum ad sui morbi tractationem. Et Boethius revelat morbum suum respondens se turbari ut his quæ injuriose fiebant contra ipsum, ex sui in exilium relegatione & meriti sui frustratione ex injusta sui condemnatione ex fame sui læsione, & tandem ex his quæ videbat generaliter injuriosa aliis inferre, & hæc omnia sibi evenisse propter studia ipsius.

In

In the fourth Prose Philosophy requires of *Boethius* upon his attention to those things have beene said, and exhorts him to the handling of his own disease. And *Boethius* reveales his disease, answers that he was troubled, that these things were done injuriously against him from the time of his banishment, and the frustration of the reward of his merits, from his unjust condemnation, and hurt of his fame: and at length out of these which hee saw generally injurious things were cast upon others: and all these came upon him by reason of his study in Philosophy.

In Metro 5. Boethius exclamat contra providentiam divinam, admittens quod omnia reguntur a Deo præter actus humanos: sed si homo similis sit, cum turbato Boethio hæc videbatur imo rogat Deum ut regeret actus hominum ne sic perversi prævalerent adversus bonos impune.

In the fifth Meeter *Boethius* exclaims against the providence of God, admiting that all things are governd by God but humane actions: but if man be lighter troubled, to *Boethius* these things seemed sore, but hee intreats God that he would govern humane actions, that the perverse should not so prevail without punishment against good men.

In Prosa 5. ostendit quomodo Philosophia se habuit ad suam querimoniam, & quid ex ea cognovit, recolligit sub brevitate ea quæ Boethium perturbaverant, dicens modum remedii ipsum Boethium.

In the fifth Prose he sheweth how Philosophy behaved her selfe towards his complaint, and what shee gathered out of that, and she briefly recollects what troubled *Boethius*, saying that the meanes of remedy was *Boethius* himselfe.

In Metro 6. Philosophia probat in omnibus ordinem esse servandum, & facit hoc tribus exemplis.

In the sixth Meeter Philosophy proves, that in all things order is to be observed, and doth this by 3. examples.

In Prosa 6. & ultima, inquirit causam radicalem infirmitatis Boethii, & de circumstantiis gubernatoris mundi, & de principio & fine rerum, colligendo omnes infirmitates

Boethii omnes tum esse curabiles, & dicit Philosophia sibi primo velle proponere remedia levia, praetera gravia reservare donec melius convaluisset & roboretur.

In the sixth Prose and the last, she enquires the radicall cause of *Boethius* his infirmity, and of the circumstances of the governour of the world, and of the beginning and end of things, collecting all the infirmities of *Boethius*, and that all of them are curable, and Philosophy saith, that she would first propose to her selfe slight remedies, and afterwards reserve the greater till he were better recovered and strengthened.

In Metro 7 & ultima, Philosophia probat per exempla quod caliga perturbationum impedit mentis intuitum, hortando ad fugam eorum quae catenant animam scilicet gaudium amorem, & spem, & dolorem, & se abjiciendo nonnunquam potest mens talibus perpedita Philosophari.

In the seventh and last Meeter, Philosophy proveth by examples, that darkness of pertubations is an impediment to the eye of the mind, exhorting us to the abandoning of them, seeing they enslave the soule, to wit, by casting away joy, feare, hope, and griefe; for it was impossible for the soule to convert it selfe to the study of Philosophy, when it was taken up with passions of this nature.

LIB. II.

2. *Liber habet* 8. *Prosus, &* 8. *Metra. In Prosa* 1. *effundit Boethius quid Philosophia fecit post praedictam. Et Philosophia resumit unam causam doloris Boethii, i. e. de fortuna omnibus mirabilem effectum fortunae, excusans se de resumptione praeteritae felicitatis Boethii: omnem opportunitatem medendi Boethium, & procedit ad medicamenta.*

The second Book contains eight Proses, and eight Meeters. In the first Prose *Boethius* shewes what Philosophy did after which she had layd out before. And Philosophy resumeth one cause of the griefe of *Boethius*; to wit, concerning fortune discovering the admirable effect of fortune, excusing her selfe concerning the resumption of the past felicity of *Boethius*: and likewise sheweth the opportunity

tunity of curing *Boethius*, & proceedeth to the Medicines.

In Metro 1. Philosophia describit motus fortunæ, viz. quod more roti semper alternat se.

In the 1. Meteor Philosophy describes the conditions of fortune, to wit, that shee turns her self in manner of a wheele.

In Prosa 2. Philosophia introducit fortunam ostendentem non esse dolendum de ea.

In the 2. Prose, Philosophy brings in fortune shewing, that men ought not to be grieved for her.

In Metro 2. conqueritur de inexpleta cupiditate hominum.

In the 2. Meeter, she complains of the unsatisfied covetousness of men.

In Prosa 3. ostendit quod fortuna multa bona Boethio contulit in enumerando ipsa bona præterita per ordinem.

In the 3. Prose shee shews, that fortune hath conferd many good things upon *Boethius*, in declaring these good things in just order.

In Metro 3. Philosophia determinat ex tribus exemplis mutabilitatem mundanorum.

In the 3. Meeter Philosophy determines from 3. examples, the mutability of worldly things.

In Prosa 4. Philosophia ostendit quomodo Boethius adhuc multa habuit bona fortuna ex parte Symachi soceri sui & ex parte pudicæ conjugis, & ex parte filiorum, & ex his consolatur eum ostendens felicitatem temporalem nulli posse totaliter evenire, & de quanto aliquis est felicior tanto leviori adversitate prosternitur; & ex hoc concludit felicitatem fortunitam miseram & amaram, & quod in rebus fortuitis non possit consistere vera felicitas quod etiam mors cuncti debetur.

In the 4. Prose Philosophy shewes, how *Boethius* had yet many of fortunes good things, from the part of *Symachus* his father in Law, & from the part of his modest wife, and from the part of his children, and from these she comforts him, shewing that temporall felicity can totally happen to no man, and by how much a man is happier, by

ſo much he is caſt down by lighter adverſity, and from this ſhe concludes, that the chance of felicity is miſerable and bitter, and that in caſuall things it cannot conſiſt, becauſe death is due to every one.

In Metro 4. Philoſophia commendat viam mediocrem per ſimilitudinem ædificii mediocriter ſituati.

In the 4 Meeter Philoſophy commends a mean life, by the ſimilitude of a building ſituate in a middle place.

In Proſa 5. ponit remedia pauciora quod fortuna non ſit ſummopere expetenda, oſtendens ignobilitatem divitiarum gemmarum agrorum veſtium clientium incomparatione ad hominem, & quod homines prædicta nimium diligentes faciunt injuriam ſuo conditori.

In the 5. Proſe ſhe ſets down fewer remedies, that fortune is not with too much labour to bee ſought, ſhewing the ignobleneſſe of riches, jewells, lands, garments, clients, in compariſon to man, and that men too-much loving the foreſaid things, doe injury to their maker.

In Metro 5 Philoſophia commendat antiquam ætatem quæ multâ pace & ſobrietate florebat.

In the 5. Meeter, Philoſophy commends ancient age which flouriſhed with much peace and ſobriety.

In Proſa 6. Philoſophia oſtendit quod dignitates & poteſtates non ſunt magnopere appetendæ quia adveniunt malis & ſolum poſſunt corpus; ſcilicet divitiæ, vanæſcunt & periculoſæ.

In the 6. Proſe, Philoſophy ſhewes that dignities and powers are not very much to be deſired, becauſe they fall to the lot of the wicked, and only can bleſſe the body, to wit, vain riches they are and dangerous.

In Metro 6. oſtendit nequitiam potentis Neronis qui ideo infamis factus fuit, quia imperator erat.

In the 6. Meeter, ſhee ſhewes the wickedneſſe of the mighty *Nero*, who therefore was made infamous becauſe he was Emperour.

In proſa 7. Philoſophia oſtendit quod gloria etiam juſtè acquiſita non eſt appetenda, quia mundo eſt ſtrictus, & gentes ſunt

multæ

multæ & quod una gens laudat alia damnat, & quia etiam gloria non peraudit, & quod notanter virtuosi non debent quærere gloriam. Prima pertinet ad levitatem arrogantiæ, 2. quod nihil spectat ad animam quæ immortalis est & deformis.

In the 7. Prose Philosophy shewes, that glory though justly gotten, is not to be desired, because the world is narrow, and the nations are many, and that which one commends another condemns, and because glory also is not lasting. And because by name the vertuous ought not to seek glory, first, because it pertains to the levity of arrogance: secondly, because it belongeth nothing to the soul which is immortall and without shape.

In Metro 7. Philosophia probat gloriam non esse quærendam quod cælum latum est & terra strictissima; & adducit viros illustros quorum gloria periit, nisi hoc solum quod a pauculis literis nominatur.

In the 7. Meeter Philosophy proves that glory is not to be sought after, because heaven is large, and the earth most strict. And he instances in Illustrious men whose glory is perished, unlesse in this only, that they are named in a very few letters.

In 8. & ultimâ Prosâ Philosophia ostendit quod bonum est in fortuna sed melius in adversa quam prospera, & quod adversa fortuna ostendit amicos prospera flores nutrit.

In the 8. and last Prose Philosophy shews, what good there is in fortune, but the greatest good in the adverse, rather then in the prosperous, and the adverse fortune shewes true friends, the prosperous nourisheth a fading flower.

In Metro 8. & ultimo commendat amorem quantum fecit bona, sine quo cuncta ad interitum tunst & miserum genus hominum amor divinus regat, tunc vere felix esse posset.

In the 8. and last Meeter, shee commends love, how many good things it doth, without which all things tend to death, and wisheth that mankind were governed by divine love, then might it be truly happy.

Tertius Liber habet 12. Prosas & 12. Metra. In Prosa 1. Boethius ostendit se esse quodammodo curatum & paratum ad remedia graviora, & Philosophia hac attestatur, & promittit se velle sibi ostendere felicitatem veram, & Boethius petit hæc.

The 3 Book hath 12. Proses and 12. Meeters. In the first *Boethius* shewes that he is in a maner cured, and ready for stronger medicines, and Philosophy witnesseth this, and promiseth that she will shew him true felicity: and *Boethius* requires this of her.

In 1. Metro Philosophia commendat ordinem quo primo dicunt nosci similia sapientiæ, deinde vera, & facit hoc per exempla quatuor. 1. Agro purgando, melle gustando, imbre fugando, aere mundando.

In the 1. Meeter Philosophy commends order, by which first men say they know like things, and then true, and she doth this by fowre examples. First, by clearing a field, tasting honey, avoyding a shower, and purging the ayre.

In Prosa 2. Philosophia ostendit quod omnes hominis naturaliter appetens pervenire ad veram beatitudinem, cujus etiam ponit definitionem & quod homines diversis erroribus abducuntur a vera felicitate, & ponit diversas opiniones circa felicitatem. Et ostendit quod quærentes divitias velut summum bonum errant: similiter de potentia, reverentia, & celebritate, vel gloria & lætitia.

In the 2. Prose Philosophy shewes, that all men naturally desire to come to true happines, and sets downe the definition thereof. And that men are drawne away from true felicity by divers errours. And sets downe divers opinions about felicity. And shewes that those who seeke riches as their chiefe good, doe erre. In like manner, of power, reverence, celebrity, or glory, and mirth.

In Metro 2. Philosophia ponit quanta sit vis naturæ, quod omnia sequuntur suam naturam, Leones, avicula, virga

quasi virga violenter deorsũ tracta, atq; ita cælum & omnia.

In the second Meeter, Philosophy sets down how great the force of nature is, that all things follow their nature, Lyons, Little-birds, as a young tree violently drawn downward, the heaven and all other things.

In 3 Prosa ostendit Philosophia quod vera felicitas non consistat in his quibus homines putant eam consistere. Notantur 1. quod non consistat in divitiis, eo quòd non faciant hominem in his sufficientem. 2. Quod conferant indigentiam. 3. Invehit contra avaros quos divitiæ intuenti solicitudo anxios reddit, ampliora concupiscere facit, et ne habita perdantur, pavore continuo compellit.

In the 3 Prose Philosophy shews, that true felicity consists not in these, in which men think she is. Namely, first, That it consists not in riches, because they make not a man sufficient. Secondly, That they confer upon him indigency. Thirdly, She inveighs against the covetous, their looking of which renders them suspicious, and carefull makes them covet greater, and lest the gotten should be lost, compells them to fear continually.

In Mitro 3 ostendit quomodo dives avarus, etiamsi omnia habeat, attamen adhuc sitire ampliora non cessat.

In the 3 Meeter she shews, how a rich covetous man although he hath all, yet ceaseth not to thirst after greater things.

In Prosa 4. Philosophia probat quod non conferant hominibus ad reverentiam. 1. Quod dignitas non adveniens non auferat honorem. 2. Quia dignitates manifestant vitia improborum. 3. Quod opinione hominum vilescunt. 4 Ex temporum mutatione sordescunt et splendere desinunt, hoc ideo quod in sola opinione consistunt.

In the fourth Prose Philosophy proves, that they confer not to a man any thing towards reverence, 1. because dignity not comming, takes not away honour. Secondly, because dignities manifest the vices of the wicked. Thirdly, because they waxe base in the opinion of men. Fourthly, because by the change of times they become

ſordid and leave their ſplendour, for this reaſon, becauſe they have their conſiſtence in opinion.

In Metro 4. Philoſophia confirmat per neronis exemplum cui bonum fuiſſet ad imperium non veniſſe.

In the fourth Meeter, Philoſophy confirms it by the example of *Nero*, to whom it had been good not to have attained the Empire.

In Proſa 5 Philoſophia, probat regnum & regni familiares veram potentiam non conferre. 1. Propter paucitatem durationis regnantium. 2. Propter parvitatem extentionis. 3. Annexum timorem. 4. Propter abſentiam ſecuritatem. 5. Propter neceſſitatem manendi in Officio.

In the fifth Proſe Philoſophy proves, that a Kingdome and Familiars of it do not confer true power. Firſt, by the ſmall laſting of it, and of the rulers. Secondly, by reaſon of the narrowneſſe of its extent. Thirdly, for the fear that is annexed to it. Fourthly, for the abſenſe of ſecurity. Fifthly, for the neceſſity of ſtaying in the Office.

In Metro 5. Philoſophia oſtendit quomodo vera potentia ſit acquirenda, viz. animos feroces domando.

In the fifth Meeter Philoſophy ſhews, how true power may be acquired by taming fierce minds.

In Proſa 6. Philoſophia oſtendit quod gloria mundana non facit hominem beatum. 1. Notanter quod eſt vana & fallax ſed nec illa quæ eſt meritis conquiſita, quod ſapienti de gloria non eſt cura, neque de eo quod illa non eſt ejus ſed parentum, eum & quodammodo nobilitate eo neceſſitat, ut ei filii nobilium bonos parentes ſequantur ne degenerent. Ergo gloria mortalium hominum nihil aliud eſt quam magna animæ inflatio.

In the ſixt Proſe Philoſophy ſhewes that mundane glory makes not a man happy. 1. Signally becauſe it is vaine and deceitfull and not that neither which is got by merit. That a wiſe man hath no regard of glory. But neither that of nobility becauſe that is not his but his parents, and neceſſitates him in a ſort that the children of good parents ſhould follow their ſteps, leaſt they ſhould degenerate. Therefore the glory of mortall men is nothing elſe than a great

great swelling of the mind.

In Metro 6. Philosophia ostendit quod omnes homines sunt æque nobiles præter vitiosos, Dei enim genus sumus.

In the sixt Meeter Philosophy shewes that all men are equally noble besides the vitious, for we are a kin to God.

In Prosa 7. Philosophia probat quod in voluptate non sit beatitudo eo quod multas incõmoditates includit. Atq; etiam si sic esset pecudes tunc beatificarentur. Item felicitas nec est in matrimonio quia inde sunt nequissimi filii qui tortores parentum sunt potius quam beatificatores.

In the Seventh Prose Philosophy prooves that in voluptuousnesse is not beatitude, because it includes many discommodities. And if so, then should beasts be beatified. Also neither is felicity in matrimony because thereby most wicked sons are begotten, which are rather tormentors of their Parents than makers of their happinesse.

In Metro 7. Confirmat predicta per mel & per fixuram apis, quia cum dulcedine pungit.

In the Seventh Meeter, shee confirmes the aforesaid by Hony and by the Sting of the Bee because it pricks with the sweetnesse.

In Prosa 8. ostendit quantis malis sunt multiplicata predicta bona. Ostendit etiam quam vilia sunt bona corporis quæ in aliis animalibus perfectiora sunt ut magnitudo fortitudo. Quod etiam pulchritudo nimis cito perit quæ in tenui cute flavescit.

In the eight Prose shee shewes with how great Evils those foresaid goods are infolded: shee also shewes how base the goods of the body are, which are more perfect in other animals, as greatnesse and streng th, and also that faireneſse too soon perisheth which waxeth yellow in the thin skin.

In Metro 8. Philosophia deplangit errores hominum qui in acquirendo minima bona sunt prudentes, sed acquirendo summum bonum abducuntur ignorantia & hæc homines sectantes non adipisci posse, quæ pollicentur & probat quod illa quinque sufficientia, potentia, gloria, lætitia & reverentia

reverentia ſunt unum. Et ergo qui quærit unum ſine aliis non invenit quod quærit, et de iſto proponit ſibi veram beatitudinẽ, ſed prius vult Deminum invocare ut ipſe eam oſtendat.

In the eight Meeter, Philoſophy bewaileth the error of men who in getting the leaſt goods are prudent, but in the acquiring of the chiefe good are led away with ignorance, and ſhe exhorts men following her, that they cannot gain that which thoſe things promiſe: & proves that thoſe five, ſufficiency, power, glory, mirth and reverence, are one. And therefore hee that ſeekes the one without the other finds not that which he ſeeks; & from that ſhee propoſeth to her ſelfe true beatitude: but firſt ſhee will pray God that he will ſhew it.

In Metro 9. orationem optimam pro ſummo bono & vera beatitudine cognoſcenda ponit.

In the ninth Meeter, ſhee maketh an excellent prayer for the chiefe good, and that hee may know true beatitude.

In Proſa 10. Philoſophia probat veram beatitudinem eſſe diligenter in quirendam & oſtendit in quo conſiſtit vera beatitudo. viz. in Deo, & non in aliquo extrinſeco, tanquam a Deo diſtincto ut in accidente quod probat quadrupliciter. 1. Quod non ineſt Deo ab extrinſeco. 2. Quod ſic Deus non eſſet ſummum bonum. 3. Quod eſt omnium principium. 4. Quod alias eſſent plura ſumma bona: Corollarium ſequitur quod omnis beatus eſt Deus, item iſta ſupradicta non ſunt partes integrales beatitudinis vel membra, quia Deus ſimplex in eſſentia nihilominus multa continere beatitudo videtur quæ revera ad eum referuntur.

In the tenth Proſe, Philoſophy proveth that true felicity is to be earneſtly ſought after: and he proceeds to ſhew in which true happineſſe doth conſiſt, to wit, in God, and in no other externall thing that is different from God as an accident, which he confirmes with four reaſons. Firſt, becauſe God receives it not from an externall cauſe. Secondly, becauſe, if ſo, God could not be himſelfe the chiefeſt good. Thirdly, becauſe God is the beginning of all

things

things. Fourthly, because otherewise there would bee more then one chiefest good. Hence the corollarie is, that every one that is happy is a God. Likewise those five before mentioned are not the integrall parts or members of felicity, because God is a simple essence: but yet true happinesse seemes to containe many things which indeed are but referred unto him.

In Metro 10 *Philosophia hortatur ad illam veram beatitudinem pervenire qua inventa habentur omnia.*

In the tenth Meeter Philosophy exhorts us to the attainment of true happinesse, which being found all things are found.

In Prosa 11. *Ostendit quod bonum est quod omnia appetunt & inde bonum & unum sunt reciproca & quod omnia appetunt esse, & permanere, ut animalia arbores & planta cujus sunt quatuor signa, scilicet certitudo loci & scitus dispositio partium interiorum & exteriorum, & seminis propagatio: inanimata etiam moventur ad sua propria loca per naturalem inclinationem, & conservare unitatem per continuationem partium suarum ad invicem nituntur, quare bonum est finis et desiderium omnium.*

In the eleventh Prose he shewes that it is the true good which all doe desire, and that good and one are reciprocall; and that all things desire to bee, and to continue being; as both animals, trees, and plants, which is evidenced by four signes, that is the certainty of place and site, the forming of the internall and externall parts, and the increase of their seed: yea inanimate creatures moove to their proper places and centers by their naturall inclinations, and they endeavour to preserve unity and continuation of their parts one to another. Therefore that which is good, is the end and desire of all things.

In Metro 11. *Philosophia ostendit modum quo possumus pervenire ad cognitionem veri, scilicet per retractationem ab occupationibus exterioribus & recursum ad interiora cum adjutorio doctrinæ.*

In the eleventh Meeter Philosophy shewes the meanes

wherby we may come to the knowledge of that which is rightly true: that is by withdrawing ones selfe from externall imployments, and by having recourse to more inward things by the helpe of learning.

In Prosa 12. & ultima Philosophia ostendit quibus gubernaculis mundus regitur, & probat mundum regi a Deo tripliciter. 1. Ex connumeratione partium diversarum. 2. Ex conservatione cunctorum. 3. Ex dispositione motuum & ex parte loci ac temporis spacii & qualitatis, & ostendit quod mundus regitur a Deo per suam bonitatem, & quod Deus omnia disponit fortiter & suaviter & quod malum nihil est, quia Deus potest omnia sed non potest malum, & discursus omnes esse cognitos in rebus de quibus loquimur.

In the 12 Prose and last Philosophy shewes by whom the world is governed: and hee prooves three wayes that the world is governed by God. First from the conjunction of parts of different nature. Secondly from the preserving them thus joyned. Thirdly from the ordering of motions in respect of place, time, space, and quallity. And he shewes that the world is governd by God, by his Goodnesse, and that God disposeth of all things powerfully and pleasantly, and that evill is nothing, in that God can doe all things but evill: and that the discourses of all are known in the things of which we speake.

In Metro 12. Et ultima Philosophia hortatur ad perseverandum in contemplatione beatitudinis ostendens per fabulam Orphei Cytharistæ quomodo affectus mundanorum impedit perseverantiam in bono quia facilitèr recurrit homo ad ea quæ dilexerat.

In the twelfth and last Meeter of the 13 Booke Philosophy exhorts us to persever in the contemplation of happinesse, shewing by the fable of *Orpheus* the Musitian, how that the love of worldly things hinders the perseverance in good, because man readily falls backe to that which he formerly loved.

Quar. lib. habet 7. Proſas & 7. Metra egregie probantia quod Divinum regimen optimum eſt et quod hoc non videtur inſipientibus, eo quod improborum quidam floreſcunt, quida juſti conculcantur. Nihilominus quod mortales licet boni myſterium non plene intelligunt, idcirco Philoſophia benignè oſtendit hoc eſſe rationabile.

The fourth Booke hath ſeven Proſes and ſeven Meeters, moſt egregiouſly proving that the Divine government is moſt excellent, and that this is not ſeene by the unwiſe, by reaſon that ſome bad men flouriſh, and juſt men are trodden under foot; notwithſtanding that mortalls though good, do not fully underſtand this myſtery, therefore Philoſophy doth benignly ſhew that this is reaſonable.

In 1. Proſa Boethius *adhuc quaſi languens non plene oblitus priſtinæ turbationis incipit ingemiſcere cum admiratione & intentionem Philoſophiæ volentis adhuc plura loqui interrumpit inquiens? Quomodo poſſit hoc convenire cum præmiſſis: ſcilicet ex quibus Deus optimus optime gubernans omnia, quare in ſuo regno vitia dominarentur, et virtutes luerent ſupplicia ſcelerum. Ad hoc Philoſophia pulcre reſpondet omnino iſtis perverſis carere eſt impoſſibile, quod in domo bene diſpoſita vilia vaſa nullo modo clareſcunt, nec pretioſa ſordeſcunt, ſic virtutes ſemper pretioſa ſunt & vitia abjecta monſtrantur.*

In the Firſt Proſe *Boethius* yet as it were languiſhing not fully forgetting his former troubles, begins to groan with admiration, and interrupts the intention of Philoſophy, willing as yet to ſpeake more, ſaying how can this agree with the premiſſes; to wit, by which the beſt that excellently

excellently, governs all, wherefore in his kingdome should vice domineere and virtues suffer the punishment of wickednesse. To this Philosophy fairly answereth that altogether, they are wanting all perverse things, this is altogether impossible; in a house well ordered base vessells doe no way shine, nor are the precious sordid: so virtues are alwayes precious and vices are declared abject.

In primo Metro ostendit Philosophia, quomodo possit homo plene curari, atque ut intelligat predicta viam per quã devenitur ad summum bonum: intimat scilicet, per considerationem creaturarum, quæ gradatim ascendunt more avis sursum tendendo, usquedum perveniatur ad aliquid quod super omni creatura illucescat, & ita per subtilem intelligentiam illius supremi rectoris qui omnia temperatissime gubernat. Tunc videbit horrendos tyrannos esse exules.

In the First Meeter Philosophy shewes how a man may bee fully cured, that hee may understand the foresaid, shee intimates the way by which a man may come to the chiefe good, to wit, by the consideration of the creatures which by degrees are to bee transcended after the manner of a bird striving upwards till you come to somewhat that out shines all creatures, and so by the subtiltie of intelligence of that supreame rector who governs all things most temperately. Then shall hee see the horrid Tyrant to bee a Banditoe.

In Prosa 2 efficacitur curam adhibet Boethio per rationes multas probando contra vulgi opinionem, quod soli boni sunt potentes: quod volunt & possunt adipisci bonum; & quod mali hoc non volunt, igitur non possunt & per contrariũ sunt impotentes. Nam duo sunt ex quibus actus humani procedunt, scilicet voluptas & potestas ex quorum altero nihil educi possit. Item si duo sint qui nolint unum opus facere & debito modo unus procedit alter non valet, puta ambulare qui claudus est constant quod impotens est. Et boni sunt similes volenti incedentibus motu pedum, mali vero manu intendentibus deficiunt ab eo quia natura maxime intendit, scilicet a bono & ab eo tanto sint impotentiores & miseri quanto bonum

numquod negligunt eſt melius & dicunt quæ boni ambulant tantum quod nihil via ſupereſt: mali vero in foribus errant. Item malus homo eſt homo ſicut homo mortuus eſt homo & id quod mali poſſunt, hoc idem eſt in potentia eorum & ergo potentia malorum eſt nulla quod ſolum malum & hoc eſt nihil, quod Deus poteſt omnia & non poteſt malum. Item mali non ſunt boni, igitur non ſunt potenter quod potentia eſt bonae item naturaliter omnes appetunt omne quod poteſt deſiderari ſcil ſummum bonum in quo eſt vera beatitudo. Liquit igitur illos ſolos potentes qui hoc poſſunt adipiſci ſed hoc mali nequeunt quia ad beatitudinem probra id eſt vitia non veniunt.

In the third Proſe Philoſophy uſeth efficaciouſly the cure to *Boethius* proving by many reaſons the contrary to the vulgar opinion, that onely the good are powerfull, becauſe they will and obtain good; And that the bad will not therefore they cannot; and by the contrary are impotent. For two things there are from which mens veiw doth proceed to wit, pleaſure and power, of which the one can produce nothing. Alſo if there be two which will not doe the ſame work, and one of them proceed in a deue manner, the other, cannot, for inſtance walk, he that is lame is apparantly impotent. And the good are like thoſe that goe up right by the motion of their feet. But the evill like thoſe who endeavour by the hard, becauſe they fail of that which nature principally intends; to wit, good, and by that they are mone impotent and miſerable by how much the good they neglect is the better, and they ſay the good walk ſo far that there is nothing remaining of their way, but the bad do erre even in their ſetting forth. Alſo a bad man is a man as a dead man is a man, and whatſoever a bad man can do this is no more than impotency, and therefore the power of the bad is now, becauſe they can onely do evill and that is nothing, that God can do all things, yet cannot do evill, alſo the evill are not good therefore they are not powerfull becauſe power is good, Alſo naturally all deſire all that may be deſired, to wit, the cheif good in which is the cheife

beatitude. Therefore it is plain they are onely potent who can obtain this, but this the wicked cannot, because to beatitude wickedness (is vices come not.

In Metra 2. Ostendit regulam de principibus hujus seculi si sunt mali & quomodo veraciter sint impotentes quia non possunt facere quod volunt, & quasi ligati gravibus catenis, atque etiam acerbis passionum aculeis flagellantur nec unquam tranquilli sunt, sed rabie, superbia, libidine, tristitia, & spe vanâ agitantur.

In the second Meeter she shewes a rule concerning the potentates of this age, that if they be evill, how truly impotent they are, because they are not able to do what they would, being as it were fettered with weighty chains. They are also scourged with the sharpe pricks of their passions; nor have any tranquillity, but are actuated with fury, pride, lust, sadness, and vainhope.

In 3 Prosa ostendit malis nunquam deesse sua supplicia, nec bonis deesse sua præmia Nullam esse præmi nisi respectu boni: sed boni nunquam carent bono, eo quod nemo potest esse bonus qui bono caret, igitur nunquam carent præmio. Item omnis pœna est de ratione mali, quia mali nunquam volunt carere malo, igitur nunquam carent supplicio, supplicium enim summum est expertem esse boni; hæc autem pœna quæ inseperabiliter adest malis naturam vehementer inficit, & ab humanâ conditione dejicit. Ita quod probitate derelicta, unusquisque hominem esse desierit, nec in statum divinum transire possit, & in belluam vertitur ita avarus ut lupus, iracundus, canis, fraudulentus vulpes, accidiosus asinus, inconstans, avis dici potest. E contra cum ipsum bonum beatitudo sit, bonos omnes eo ipso quo boni sunt fieri, beatos liquet, & quod beati sunt eos convenit esse deos, quod utique summum præmium est in asseribile. Et quia præmium bonorum est fieri Deos, supplicium malorum est bestias fieri.

In the third prose she shews that evil men never want their punishments, nor good men their rewardes.

That there is no reward but in respect of good. But good men never want good. Because none can be good

who

who want good, therefore they never want their reward: ſo likewiſe all puniſhment is in reſpect of evill, becauſe evill men will never want evill, therefore they never want puniſhment. For it is the greateſt puniſhment to be void of good, but this puniſhment which inſeperably accompanies evill men very much defiles nature, and precipitates from humanity, ſo that when goodneſs being relinquiſhed, any one ceaſes to be a man, nor can be changed into a divine he is transform'd into a brute, as a covetous man may be called a wolfe, an angry man a dogg, a deceitfull man a fox, a ſluggiſh man an aſſe, an inconſtant man a bird: on the contrary good it ſelfe being a beatitude, it is cleare that all good men are made happy in that wherein they are good, and they who are happy likewiſe they are good, and their reward is not to be taken away: and becauſe it is the reward of good men to be made Gods, it is the puniſhment of the evill to be made Beaſts.

In *Metro* 3. *Philoſophia ſolacii cauſa fabulam introduxit Viſſis ejus ſocii per feminam quandam quæ Circe dicebatur in diverſas beſtias corporaliter, non mentaliter, quia ſenſum retinebant, transformati fuerant et concludit quod transformatio mentis per vitia, corpore manente eodem, pejor eſt quam transformatio corporis in beſtiam, aut pecus anima ſua manente, ſi talis per naturam transformatio poſſibilis eſſet.*

In the third Meeter, for comfort ſake, Philoſophy bringing the ſtory of Uliſſes, whoſe companions were transform'd by one Circe into ſeverall beaſts, corporally not mentally, becauſe they retained ſence. And ſhe concludes that the transformation of the mind by vices, the body remaining the ſame, is worſe then a corporall Metamorphoſes into a beaſt or brute, the ſoul remaining, the ſeme if a transformation by nature could poſſible be.

In *Proſa* 4. *Boethius rationibus ſupradictis aſſentit malos ſemper infelices, tamen adhuc quaſi ſtatu more eis indignatur*

tur qui serviunt in bonos & vellet quod hoc ita non esse posset, sed potius cito auferrentur de medio. Hanc impatientiam arguit Philosophia, & suo loco probare promittit quod non licet sapienti sic indignari, sed magis compati, facimus corpotaliter ægrotis; valde enim miseri sunt vitiosi dum cupit a quæ volunt perficiant & miseriores quam si ea perficere non possunt, & subjungit quod mali sunt faeliciores qui puniti sunt quam qui non sunt puniti, & tanto infaeliciores quanto diuturniores, & quanto minus puniuntur: & quod illi sunt miseriores qui faciunt injuriam quam qui eam patiuntur. Ostendit etiam qua miseria malorum esset sine fine si eorum vita esset infinita & quod malitia eorum est miseria, & addit quod malos puniri bonum est. Primo quod aliquando resipiscunt a malo; secundo quod alii videntes eorum terrorem, declinat a malo. 3. quod eorum miseriæ additur aliquid boni, scil. pœna qua ratione justitiæ bona est, & quod propter malum purgatorium vel infernum post mortem requiritur, et quod opinio vulgi contraria est opinioni Philosophiæ, & quod opinioni vulgi non sit assentiendum; & ille qui facit injuria est puniendus & non cui facta est primus igitur est inferior, atque judices potius debenti miseri ut compatiantur facientibus injuriam quam eandem patientibus. Quia ergo ad sapientium pertinet omne odium a se repellere & cunctis velle prodesse imo debent clementer expectare & provocare discholos ad panitentiam, & plus compati his qui inferunt injuriam, quam qui patiantur tanquam infaelicioribus oportet.

In the fourth Prose *Boethius* yields to the reasons above mentioned, that evill men are unhappy, yet still after the common custome has indignation for them because they tyrannize over the good, and would that this could not be so, but rather that they might suddenly be cut off. Philosophy condemns this passion, and promises in its proper place to prove that it is unlawfull for a wise man to be so angry, but rather to suffer, as we shew in those who are bodily sick: for wicked men are very miserable even when they bring to passe what they do desire, and more miserable

ble then if they did not effect them. And she adds that the evill are more happy who are punnisht then those who are not punisht, and by how much the more durable and less punish'd by so much they are the more miserable. And that they are more miserable who do an injury then who suffer it. Further more she shews that the affliction of the evil are infinite if thire life could be so; and that their malice is their misery, and adds that is good for them to be punished. First because some time they repent them of the evil. Secondly that some apprehending terrours do decline them from evil. Thirdly, because there is some good annex'd to their misery, viz. punishment which in respect of justice is good. And that after death there is purgatory or hell required for evill. And that the opinion of the vulgar is contrary to the opinion of Philosophy, and that we must not be led by their opinion. The first therefore is the inferior, and Judges ought to imitate rather in this thing, that they may have Compassion of them that doe the injury, then on them that suffer it. Therefore they that have any relation unto wisdom, ought to repell from themselves all hatred, and to have a desire to profit all men, yea they ought to expect for and to provoke all disobedient men to repentance, and ought to have compassion the more on those which offer the wrong, then those that suffer it, as the more miserable

In quarto Metro Philosophia jucunde confirmat quæ dixit et exclamat contra homines illos qui bellicis motibus se invicem ex odio ad mortem deducunt, hoc dicens quod nemo debet mortem malorum desiderare quæ de se quam plurimus sine bello appropinquat & quod juste quoque diligendi sunt boni & mali misericorditer.

In the fourth Meter Philosophy delectably confirms what she had delivered, and exclaims against such who by warlike commotions proceeding from enmity, mutally kill one another saying, that no man ought to desire the death of the evill, which of it selfe without warrs, approaches many; and that good men are to bee loved

of right, and the evill out of compassion.

In Prosa 5. Boethius quasi proficiens in scientiâ plures incipit dubitationes habere quam antea habuit; & ait, perpendo quod in bonis fortuitis est aliquid boni, eo quod expediens est Rhetoribus et sapientibus & politicarum gubernatoribus easdem habere & nunc stuporem meum Deus Rector exaggerat qui in bonis fortuitis prosperitatem constituit & rectâ ratione mundum gubernat. Quare ergo prospera & adversa accidunt bonis & malis & quasi diceret, si essem pollens opibus, honore reverendus, potentia validus &c. ut olim tunc modica ratio sufficeret, sed quia affligor, impatienti me vexat, & idcirco toties ad querendum incitor & pro consolatione, causam hujus rei desidero, & quare carceres & cruces inventa propter malos sapissime eveniunt bonis: & Philosophia respondit quod sic videtur esse propter ignorantiam scil. causa fati & divina providentiæ.

In the fifth Prose *Boethius* becoming a proficient in knowledg makes more doubts then formerly, and sayes I consider that in contingent goods there is some good, because tis very meet for rulers and wisemen and the Governors of Commonwealths to reflect on them, and now God the ruler of all augments my amazement, who in contingent good can place prosperity and governs the world in due order. Why then do prosperity and adversity indifferently befall good and evill men, as if he should say, were I rich, honorable, and potent, &c. as heretofore, then an indifferent reason might satisfie, but seeing I am afflicted, I am vexed with impatience, and for this cause have so many incitations to make my complaints, and for consolation desire the cause of this, and why that prisons and crosses found out for the punishment of the evill, become very often the portion of good men. And Philosophy answers that it is ignorance, viz in the cause of fate and divine providence that maks it appeare so.

In 5. Metro. Phil. quasi viam præparando ad inferendum Boethium dicit quod commune est hominibus res humanas mirari quarum dinoscere non causas, sed illis scitis essse superi &

& exemplum dat demotu ſiderum arcturo atque Urſa majore, quare ſcil. tardius moveantur, & de eclipſi lunæ & ſolis quæ ignorantibus mira videntur, quia nemo miratur de inquietudine aquarum flante Borea Zephyro ſimiliter de nivibus a ſolis ſolutis ſic in propoſito ſi cauſa ceſſet ceſſat & admiratio & durante cauſa ignorantia, durat admiratio.

In the fifth Meter, Philoſophy by preparing the way to inform *Boethius*, ſaying that it is uſuall with men to admire thoſe things whoſe cauſes they have been long ignorant of, but that all admiration is paſt aſſoon as they are known, he inſtances in the motion of the conſtellation Arcturus *viz.* the greater Beare, why it moves ſo ſlow. And in the Eclipſe of the moon and ſun, which ignorant people very much admire, ſo likewiſe it falls out, why none wonder at the roughneſs of the waters when the North-weſt winde blowes, or the ſuns diſſolving the ſnow, even ſo in this caſe the cauſe and the admiration both ceaſe together, and the admiration of the cauſe continues as long as the ignorance thereof.

In Proſa 6. Boethius inſtat propter declarationem quæſtionis ſuperius motæ ſcil. quare malis bona & bonis mala contingant. Et Philoſophia præmittit ejuſdem difficultatem quia ſubjectum hujus ejuſmodi eſt ut una dubitatione ſoluta alia innumerabiles ſuccreſcant, ſed tamen quoniam affectus iſta ſcire expetit: ideo ſaltem de illis pauca narrabit & ponit quod divina mentis ſtabilitas omnia gubernat, ſtatuit & diſponit. Præmittit etiam quod oportet ſcire quid ſit providentia, & quid fatum & tunc ad hoc quod quæritur recto ordine procedit, providentia ergo eſt ipſa divina ratio in ſummo omnium principe ſita, vel planius hoc modo providentia eſt diſpoſitio divina, ſive ordinatio exiſtens in mente divina quâ cuncta inferiora ſecundum ſtatum ſuæ naturæ ſunt proviſa: ſtatum vero eſt diſpoſitio inhærens rebus mobilibus per quam providentia, omni inſtit ſuis ordinibus, & ponit quod providentia & fatum non ſunt eadem, & quod fatum cum omnibus ſibi ſubjacentibus a providentia dependat: diverſæ opiniones

circa

circa fatum composuit. Scil. a quibus vel ex quo exercentur & quod omnia quæ fato subiecta sint divinæ etiam providentiæ subjacent & non e converso & hoc de circulis super eundem axem ut unum super alterum & quanto exprimo modus quid firmius divinæ providentiæ adhæreat tanto firmius a fatali mutatione servatur; deinde Philosophia comparat habitudinem fati divinæ providentiæ per quatuor similia comparat & quod fatum habet se ad providentiam sicut ratiocinatio ad intellectum: id quod tactum est ad id quod est a seipso, tempus ad æternitatem: & circulus ad punctum medium, postea ostendit quæ sint illa, quæ fato disponuntur & quod ea quæ apparent in rebus confusa non intelligentibus, sunt in divinâ providentiâ & gubernatione ordinata: & qui potest ista animadvertere optimam in singulis inveniet rationem. Item quod indifferenter bonis & malis prospera & adversa contingunt quæ non fortuito: sed summo rationis libramine & ex providentia ordinatorio proveniunt quosdam siquidem præmio, quosdam supplicio; deinde dignos præcognoscit causam generalem ostendit quare malis bona & bonis mala contingant, scil. quod homines quæ sunt in seipsi bona vel mala nesciunt, probans per similitudinem medici scientis diversis corporibus diversa convenire medicamenta & quod nescientes varietatem corporum diversificatorum in complexionibus curationis rationem ignorant, probat etiam hoc ex contrario judicio dei & hominum, allegans Lucanum de judicio Deorum & Catonem deinde causas speciales enarrat, quare malis bona eveniunt: & una est, huic deteriores fieri potuerunt si hoc bonum eis non evenisset, quod autem bonis mala non eveniunt fuit eorum meritum, & ideo eis bona eveniunt, ut prævalens improbitas reprimeretur. Item si quidem modesti afflingerentur animo fracti essent bonos reprimi & eisdem tot mala evenire hoc etiam quia aliqui eorum ex longa felicitate gloriari possent, & si non his malis exercitarentur superbirent. 2. ut inde malis mercantur & virtutum excitatione confirmentur. 3. ne plus quotuerent quam oportet. 4. ne aliquis plus præsumit quam debeat. 5. propter proiectæ mortis gloriam. 6. propter exemplum

exemplum aliorum. Quod autem mala malis adveniunt nemo admiratur, sed quod eis bona eveniunt. Prima causa est ne fiant pejores. 2. ut emendentur. 3. ut eorum miseria major existat: deinde ostendit causam quare mali malos puniant quia ita tales mali fiunt boni. Denique contra hujus rei tractationem ampliorem exclamat.

In the sixt prose *Boethius* is stil very sollicitous for the declaring the question above mentioned, viz. why good befalls evill men, and evill befalls good men, and Philosophy premises the difficulty thereof, because the subject is such that upon the solution of one doubt many more will emerge, but because tis expedient for the afflicted to know these things she will speak somthing of them, and layes down that the stability of the divine power regulates, determines, and disposeth all things. She premises farther, that tis necessary to know what is providence and fate, and then in due order proceeds to the question. *Providence* therefore is a divine counsell sited in the prince of all things. Or more plainly thus, *Providence* is a divine disposition or ordination in the divine mind, whereby all inferiours things are considered according to the state of their nature. But fate is a disposition inherent in things moveable, whereby providence chains all things in their courses. And she layes down that providence and fate are not the same, and that fate with what ever is subordinate to it, depends on providence. And she layes down severall opinions, concerning fate of whom it is exercised. And that all things that are subject to fate are also subject to divine providence, but not on the contrary. And she manifests this in circles moved one above another, as upon the same axle tree, and by how much any thing adheres the more stedfastly to divine providence, by so much the more certainly it is defended from fatal mutation. Furthermore Philosophy compares the habitude of fate to divine providence by 4 similies, to wit, fate hath relation to providence as ratiocination to the intellect, that which is made to that which is of it selfe. Time to eternity; and the circle to the Center. Afterwards she demonstrates which are

thoſe things which are diſpoſed by fate, and that thoſe things which appeare confuſed in matters to thoſe which underſtand not, are ordained in divine providence and government, and he which is able to make his obſervation of theſe things, ſhall find excellent reaſon in every one of them. In like manner that proſperity and adverſity wayed indifferently to good and bad, proceeds not by fortune but with the moſt exact poyze of reaſon, from the providence of him that ordained, for as much as he knowes ſome worthy of reward, ſome of puniſhment. Afterwards ſhe ſhews the generall reaſon, why good things happen to evill men, and evill to the good, to wit becauſe men are ignorant which things are good and evill in themſelves, proving by the ſimilitude of a Phyſitian knowing that different medicines are ſutable to different conſtitutions, others being ignorant of the variety of Bodyes diverſifyed in their Complexions are ignorant of the reaſon of the diverſity of theirs, ſhe alſo proves this from the judgment of man contrary to that of God. Alledging Lucan concerning the judgment of the Gods, & Cato; afterwards ſhe layes down eſpeciall reaſons, why good things happen to evill men, & the one is becauſe they might have been worſe, if this good had not happened. But firſt the evill things happen not to good men, their merit is in the cauſe, and therefore good things happen to them that their impiety prevailing may be repreſſed. Likewiſe if certain modeſt men ſhould be afflicted, they would be diſcouraged, becauſe good men are repreſſed, and evills happen to them: This ſo falls out becauſe ſome of them would be apt to boaſt of the duration of their felicity, and were they not exerciſed, might grow proud. Secondly, that from thence their merits might be the greater, and by this exercise might be confirmed in their virtues: Thirdly, that ſome are more fearfull then is requiſite: Fourthly, becauſe ſome preſume more of themſelves then they ought: Fifthly, for the glory of a pretious death: Sixtly, for the example of others. But why evill things happen to evill men, none admires, but that they ſhould participate of good: the firſt reaſon is, that they become

becom not worſe: the ſecond, that there might be ſome amendment: thirdly, that their miſery might be the greater. Afterward ſhe declareth the reaſon, why wicked men puniſh thoſe that are wicked, becauſe ſo ſuch evill men become good. Laſtly, ſhe exclaimeth on any larger handling of the matter.

In Metro 6. confirmat Philoſophia quæ dicta ſunt per ſimilitudinem, jucunde alloquens Boethium, ut ita recreatus ad ſublimiora tenderet, & divinam commendat providentiam in regimine corporum cæleſtium, Elementorum temporum, generabilium & corruptibilium, ex authoritate Dei regentis. Ait ergo ſi tibi placuerit pura mente ſummi Dei judicia intelligere, aſpice cælum, & diſciplinam ſtellarum, & anni curſus quam varii videntur, & tamen unum non confundit alterum, ſic in actibus humanis omnia recte ordinantur.

In the 6. Meeter Philoſophy confirmeth thoſe things which were ſpoken of by a ſimilitude, pleaſantly treating with Boethius that ſo being refreſhed, hee might tend to ſublimer matters, and ſhe commendeth the divine power in the government of the celeſtiall bodies, Elements, Times, Generables, and corruptibles, from the authority of God ruling, ſhee ſaith therefore, if thou deſireſt with a pure minde to underſtand the judgements of the moſt high God, reflect on the Heaven, and the diſcipline of the ſtars, and the ſeaſons of the yeare, how different they ſeeme, and nevertheleſſe, one confoundeth not another, ſo in humane acts all tihngs are rightly diſpenſed.

In Proſa 7. concludit Philoſophia ex prædictis quod omnis fortuna eſt bona, tanquam adeo infallibiliter adminiſtrata unicuique ſecundum ſua merita, nam iucundos remunerat, aſperos exercet vel deturbat, & oſtendit quod vulgi ſententia ſit contraria quaſi dicat ô Boethi ne ſequaris vulgi opiniones qui ſemper de rebus peſſime cenſent ſed attende quod mutua poteſtate ſit, qualem vis fortunã fingere, et per hæc tantum hortatur fortunam ſuam magnanimiter tollerare, & in hominis poteſtate conſtitutum, formare ſibi fortunam, qualem vult, concludit.

In the seventh Prose Philosophy concludeth from the premises that all fortune is good, as it were infallibly distributed to every one according to his merits, for she rewardeth the pleasant, she exerciseth or taketh short the stubborn, and layeth open that it is contrary to the vulgar, as if she should say. O *Boethius* have a care that thou adhere not to the opinion of the vulgar, which alwayes judg things in the worst sence. But observe that it is in thy own power to forge out thy owne fortune, and by this exhorts him at length to bear fortune with a courage, concluding it to be in the power of man to frame to himself what fortune he pleaseth.

In Metro septimo Philosophia suadelam suam exemplo virorum fortium, qui spretis voluptatibus & spe laudis & gloria labores maximos subjere confirmat & per hoc hortatur virtute praditos ut a proposito suo propter labores non desistãt quia difficile enim medium tenere, & ponit tres fabulas quasi solacii causa ipsi Boethio ne nimium seriis gravetur, at ad̃ sic concludit ô fortes ite nunc per vias altas ad superna, si tanta fecerunt infideles pro gloria inani, cur vos inertes & pigri terga virtutis, id est, labores respuitis? quando terrenis & carnalibus superatis præmia vobis celestia largientur.

In the seventh Meeter Philosophy confirmeth her exhortation by the example of Couragious men, who despising pleasures for the hope of praise and glory have undergone the greatest labours. By this she exhorteth virtuous men, that they desist not from their purpose because of labours: For it is difficult to keep a mean, it layeth down three fables, as it were solacing *Boethius* that he might not be oppressed with serious matters: But she concludes, ô valiant men steere your course towards heaven. If infidels have effected so great things for vain glory, why do ye sluggards and slothfull men turn your backs, that is, refuse labours, seeing earthly and Carnall things being conquered, heavenly rewards shall be abundantly bestowed upon you.

Liber hic De Consolatione, a Præceptore meo Wintonienſi Doctore Nicolao Love ſtreni loco dabatur ab ipſo pro duodenario nulla expoſitione adhibitâ. Quid ad me tum pertinebant abſtruſa illa Philoſophiæ capita quæ exercitare ſolent maturiſſima ingenia, & vix ab aculis expediri ſolent. Thomas enim noſter licet Angelicus decimam partem eorum non intelligit. Sed per hunc librum utcunque lectam amor librorum, abhinc animum meum poſſidebat & ita ſtudio literarum me dabam. In illis multum per ſpatium duorum annorum profui: legere etiam & intelligere potui quam plurima ejuſdem libri, ſea nec jam perfectè omnia intelligo, & quicunque dicit ſe per omnia eum perfectè intelligere, dubium erit ſi opinio ejus non excedat rei veritatem. Doctiſſimi enim ſunt qui ſe per omnia eum non intelligere fateantur. Jam vero proœmii loco pauca adjecienda ſunt, liber hic de Conſolatione eſt vere aureus. Hiſque temporibus in quibus vel Athei vel Turci ſumus ſub fatali ſuo jugo univerſum hunc mundum fere ad ſuas nequiſſimas partes traxerunt, valde itaque neceſſarius lectuque digniſſimus ſit: hic etiam liber omnia fere profert quæ ſunt ſcitu neceſſaria de providentiâ, præſcientia, libero arbitrio, fato, fortunâ, caſu, æternitate, & denique quid non. In ſtudio

hujus libri jam nunc per spatium quadraginta annorum permansi, atque adhuc de aliquibus quæro : habemus Barnartium in aliquibus se confitentem reum. Thomam vero Aquinatem in multis locis ipsum Boethium obscurantem. Qui Anglico sermone hunc librum transtulit optima fide hoc egit, laudeque summa dignus est, bene quoque ipsis gregarus si rursum tipis mandaretur. Sed hoc non ausim ego sine ejus venia si in vivis, si esset sed cum superstes non sit optime faciet qui impressione nova opus ejus revocare studuerit. Quod ad me spectat quicquid vel ad expositionem vel ad ornatum hujus libri faceret omnino non omittendum censeo. Ideoque aliquid, parum licet, de meo protuli & fortassis in paucis multa & utilia quod in bonam partem consulat lector ingenuus inveniet. Nunc Boethium ipsum spectet.

Boethianæ ſunt hæ quæ ſequuntur liniæ, incipientes in Metro 9. lib. 3. Non quod quæ procedunt ſint inutilia, ſed quod quæ ſequuntur ſint Explicatione & Commentario digniora, quas Thomas Aquinas Angelicus licet Doctor haud recte interpretatur.

O Qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas,
Terrarum cæli que ſator, qui tempus ab ævo
Ire jubes, ſtabilisque manens das cuncta moveri,
Quem non externæ pepulerunt fingere cauſæ
Materiæ fluitantis opus; verum inſita ſummi
Forma boni, livore carens, tu cuncta ſuperno
Ducis ab exemplo: pulchrum pulcherrimus ipſe
Mundum mente gerens, ſimiliq; in imagine formans,
Perfectaſque jubens perfectum abſolvere partes.

Hic Angelicus Doctor paulam cecutit, & cum hæc ad mentem Ariſtotelis trahere vult Platonicum fruſtra conatus ejus ſunt, nihilque obtinet: de Ideis nunc ſecundum Platonem dicendum, primo de Idea materiæ fluitantis, id eſt, *materia prima* quæ ideo fluitans dicitur quia nullam ſtabilem habebat formam, ſed omnium ex æquo formarum capax: *Terra erat inanis & vacua, & tenebræ erant ſuper faciem Abyſſi.* (*Inſita ſummi forma boni*, hæc univerſalis *Idea & communis activa, livore carens*) odio etiam & averſione; nam Deus *vidit omnia quæ fecerat & erant valde bona*; *in cuncta ſuperno* &c. Generalis hæc eſt *Idea* ante-

dicta *perfecta*que *jubes perfectum absolvere partes*, sed non est anima mundi *nisi Deus*.

Tu numeris elementa ligas, ut frigora flammis
Arida conveniant liquidis: ne purior ignis
Evolet, aut mersas deducant pondere terras.

Nunc collecta aquæ erant, & terra apparuit: Aqua vocabatur Abyssus, Terræ vocabantur Aridum.

Tu triplicis mediam naturæ cuncta moventem
Connectens animam per consona membra resolvis.
Quæ cum secta duos motum glomeravit in orbes,
In semet rediturameat, mentemque profundum
Circuit, & simili convertit imagine cælum.

Quæro, quæsivi atque adhuc quæro interpretationem horum versuum, neque adhuc invenio; neque quisquam, uti spero non expectet solidum: sed qualemcunque habuerit boni consulat & uberiorem vel det vel meum desideret.

Thomas noster, licet Angelicus, non dedit imo magis sensum eorum obscuravit vultis habere quod loquitur ille magister noster vel noster magistrandus, sic habeto, at tamen nihil habes nisi ejusdem verba.

Hic Philosophia ostendit sapientiam ex animæ mundi productione ubi sciendum, quod ita communiter exponuntur ad intentionem. Platonis, in Timeo, sed quod ista expositio est difficillima et modicæ utilitatis ego eam pertranseo, & ponam facilem & expeditam quæ est ad mentem Aristotelis, ad cujus evidentiam notandum est quod per animam mundi intelligitur hic intelligentia movens orbem quæ per motum suum virtutem in inferioribus addit. Hæc intelligentia dicitur *media* inter deum & animam humanam: sicut enim in dignitate & perfectione excedit a deo sic ipsi animam nostram excedit: notandum quod intelligentia hujusmodi dicitur triplicis naturæ, propter tres *operationes* quas habet, movere orbem, intelligere Deum & intelligere

; intelligere ſeipſam, notandum quod orbes cœleſtes dicuntur *conſona membra* intelligentiæ, quod per ipſos tanquam per organa et inſtrumenta intelligentia inferioribus influat: Licet enim intelligentia prima, intentione moveat propter ſe, tamen ſecunda movet propter inferiora, his præmiſſis ita perſpicuum eſt ut dici poteſt. Tu Deus animam ſpiritū mundi, quæ eſt *intelligentia media* ſupple inter te & animam humanam triplicis naturæ id eſt, *triplicis operationis* cuncta moventem: ſupple inferiora per influxum illum: *tu connectens reſolvis*, id eſt diſtinguis eam per *conſona membra*, id eſt, per *convenientes* orbes, quæ anima cum ſecta id eſt diviſa, quæ tum ad operationes glomeravit id eſt impreſſit motum in duos orbes ſupple in orbem primi mobilis & in planetarum ipſa *redditura* id eſt *reflexa* motu procedit in ſemetipſam, ſemetipſam intelligendo quæ eſt *una operatio*: et ipſa circuit mentem profundam id eſt divinam, Deum intelligendo quæ eſt alia operatio: ipſa *convertit* id eſt movet cœlum ſimili imagine id eſt intellectione, quod eſt tertia ejus operatio. Notandum etiam quod licet corpora cœleſtia ſint diverſa, tamen ratione unitatis *unum Corpus* dici poſſunt, ſic licet intelligentiæ ſint diverſæ, tamen poſſunt dici una *intelligentia* propter unitatem ordinis in operatione movendi, ergo in ſingulari dicitur *Animam* & non *Animas*.

Hæc non egent confutatione ita ſibi minime cohereant: vis meam ſententiam, mallem certe te qui doctorem quemcunque probabilem quam meam proferre, vtra nec mea mihi placet, ſed qualiſcunque ſit in bonam partem conſules & emendes ſi placeat, ſic habe, Tu *triplicis* mediam *naturæ cuncta moventem*, *Connectens* animam per conſona *membra reſolvis*: tu connectens medium animam triplicis naturæ id eſt, connectis mediam animam humanum (ſcil.) triplicis naturæ id eſt vegetativæ, ſenſitivæ, & rationalis per *conſona* membra id eſt, per conſonas facultates reſolvis, quæ *dum ſecta antea motum glomeravit* in *orbes* vegetativam & ſenſitivam facultatem. In *ſemet redditura meat mentemque* profundam *Circuit*, id eſt meat in mentem profundam nem-

pe ſuipſius rationalem, *Circuit* & ſimili convertit imagine cœlum (id eſt) mentem ipſius: horreo enim dicere quod anima creata mentem divinam circuere poſſit, ita loquitur Thomas Aquinas, ſed ſi licuiſſet mihi hos verſus interpretare de anima Chriſti Dei pariter & hominis, manifeſtior eſſet ſententiæ totius expoſitio.

Tu cauſis animas paribus, vitaſque minores
Provehis, & levibus ſublimeis curribus aptans
In cœlum, terramque ſeris: quas lego benigna
Ad te converſas reduci facis igne reverti.

Quamvis vani ſint quæ Thomas profert nihil tamen de iis dicere quoniam nihil ſunt.

Tu provehis animas vitaſque minores cauſis, & ſeris in cœlum terramque aptans ſublimeis levibus curribus, Quas benigna lege reduci facis, et ad te converſus igne reverti.

Platonicum hæ nimis ſapiunt qui univerſas animas creatas autumabatur cum luce vera autem Philoſophia dicit de animis humanis quod creando infunducitur ex infundendo creantur, nova eſt enim formatio uniuſcujuſque hominis & eductio.

Da pater auguſtam menti conſcendere ſedem
Da fontem luſtrare boni, da luce reperta
In te conſpicuos animi defigere viſus.
Diliſisce terrenæ nebulas & pondera molis,
Atque tuo ſplendore mica, tu namque ſerenum,
Tu requies tranquilla piis: te cernere finis,
Principium, vector, dux, ſemita, terminus idem.

Thomas hic mihi ſatisfecit ſua expoſitione, pluribus non opus eſt.

Lib. 3. Met. XI.

Qvis quis profunda mente veſtigat verum,
Capitque nullis ille devius falli,

In

In ſe revolvat intimi lucem viſus,
Longoſque in orbem cogat inflectens motus.
Animumque doceat quidquid extra molitur,
Suis retruſum poſſidere theſauris.
Dudum quod atra texit erroris nubes.
Lucebit ipſo perſpicacius Phœbo.
Non omne namque mente depulit lumen,
Obliviosam corpus invehens molem
Hæret profectò ſemen introrſum veri,
Quod excitatur ventilante doctrina.
Nam cur rogati ſponte recta cenſetis,
Ni merſus alto viverit fomes corde?
Quòd ſi Platonis Muſa perſonat verum,
Quod quiſquis diſcit, immemor recordatur.

Expreſſa ſunt hæc & facilia ideoque interpretatione non egent.

Proſa 12. incipit Philoſophia tractationem de malo ſed quia parva profert omittenda, donec in tramatur, pleniore rem exponat, exiſtimo.

In Proſa 4. Lib. 4. hæc ſunt, nullane animarum ſupplicia poſt mortem relinquis? & magna quidem inquam, quorum alii pœnali acerbitate alii vero purgatoria clementia exerceri puto.

De his Thomas noſter commentatur, aſſenſum tamen meum præbere non poſſum Nam poſt mortem ſupplicia nulla ſunt temporalia, ubi tum Purgatorius ignis: in die tantum iudicii cernitur ubi corpus igne mundatur, & ſtramine a quæ comburuntur & corpus tanquam metallum purificatur & ita immortale fiat.

Lib. 5. MET. 3.

QUAE nam diſcors fœdera rerum

Causa resolvit? quis tanta dedit
Veris statuit bella duobus,
Ut quæ carptim singula constent,
Eadem nolent mista jugari?
An nulla est discordia veris,
Semperque sibi circa cohærent,
Sed mens, cæcis obruta membris,
Nequit oppressi luminis igne
Rerum tenueis noscere nexus,
Sed cur tanto flagrat amore
Veri tectas reperire notas?
Scitne, quod appetit anxia nosse?
Sed quid nota rescire laborat?
Et si nescit, quid cæcu petit?
Quis enim quidquam nescitus optet?
Aut quis valeat nescita sequi?
Quove inveniat, quisve repertam
Queat ignarus noscere formam?
An cùm mentem cerneret aliam,
Pariter summam & singula norat?
Nunc membrorum condita nube,
Non in totum est oblita sui,
Summámque tenet singula perdens.
Igitur quisquis vera requirit,
Neutro est habitu, nam neque novit,
Nec penitus tamen omnia nescit:
Sed, quam retinens meminit, summam
Consulit, aliè visa retractans,
Ut servatis queat oblitas
Addere partes.

Lib. 5. Met. 4.

QUÒRDAM porticus attulit
Obſcuros nimium ſenes,
Qui ſenſus, & imagines
E corporibus extimis
Credant mentibus imprimi,
Vt quondam celeri ſtylo
Mos eſt æquore paginæ
Quæ nullas habeat notas,
Preſſas figere literas.
Sed mens ſi propriis vigoris
Nihil motibus explicat,
Sed tantùm patiens jacet
Notis ſubdita corporum,
Caſſaſque in ſpeculi vicem
Rerum reddit imagines,
Unde hæc ſic animis viget
Cernens omnia notio,
Quæ vis ſingula proſpicit,
Quæ diviſa recolligit,
Aut quæ cognita dividit:
Alternumque legens iter
Nunc ſummis caput inſerit,
Nunc deſidit in infima,
Tum ſeſe referens ſibi,
Vtrùm falſa induxerit?
Hæc eſt efficiens magis
Longè cauſa potentior,
Quàm quæ materiæ data

Impreſſas

Impreſſas patitur notas.
Præcedit tamen excitans,
Ac vires animi movens,
Vivo in corpore paſſio.
Cùm vel lux oculos ferit,
Vel vox auribus inſtrepit:
Tum mentis vigor excitus,
Quas intus ſpecies tenet,
Ad motus ſimiles vocans,
Notis applicat exteris,
Introrſumque reconditis
Formis miſcet imagines.

Non hoc Metrum omittendum eſt, totam enim viam & ſcientiæ & erroris indicat: ſed jam recollige quæ diſperſæ ſunt in quinque libris de Conſolatione Boethianæ & ſi placent Commentariolum tuum adde: Breviſſimum certe erit quod de tribus prioribus, libris, agitantur: in primo Boethius Conditionem ſuam poſt ejus exilium plangit & Philoſophia eum conſolatur. In 2. oſtendit nec fortunam, nec ulla alia externa vel bona, vel mala eſſe. In 3. tractatum habet de fælicitate falſa. In hoc libro ſparſæ ſunt aliquæ ſententiæ quas recolligere neceſſum erit.

Proſa ultima Li. 3.

Philoſophia quærit num Deus facere malum poſſit, concludit malum, igitur nihil eſt, cum id facere ille non poteſt, qui nihil non poteſt.

Nunc licet pauliſper expatiari, ſi malum nihil ſit, quare Deus iraſcatur nihilo? revera tamen malum nihil eſt & tamen ira Dei juſta eſt & reale objectum habet annon hæc ludiera ſunt: imo ſeria peccatum fateare aliquid & hoc ſolum malum; at ſi quid peccatum ſit quæris, eſt averſio mentis

mentis a Deo & conversio ejusdem creaturæ quam Deus sibi constituit. Hoc situm est in animo malum, sed essentiam in se nullam habet & enim tantum ita dependentiam a deo, conatur quod nec efficere potest animi mala cupiditas quæ in eorum animo impedimentum, & nihil aliud est, ideoque in rerum natura vere nihil; nam quam materiam vel formam habet merus conatus.

Prosa 6. Lib. 4.

Iam jam maximo conamine opus est, aude aliquid *brevibus* Gyaris aut coarcere *dignum*.

Hic ipsa Philosophia ex Boethiana Christiana est, itaque ab Ethnica trahit spiritum anhelum, parce tamen inquam: ejusmodi namque materia est ut una dubitatione succisa, innumerabiles aliæ, velut Hydræ capita succrescunt, nec ullius fecerit modum nisi quis eas vivacissimo mentis igne coerceat. In hac enim de providentia simplicitate, de fati serie, de repentinis casibus, de cognitione & prædestinatione divina de arbitrii libertate quæri solet quæ quanti sunt onerisipse perpendito.

Prosa 1. Lib. 5.

Tractat casum & fortunam & ita textus in se continet: libet igitur sic definire casum esse exsqilicet, inopinatum & confluentibus causis in his quæ ob aliquid geruntur, eventum. Concurrere vero & confluere causas facit ordo ille inevitabilis connexione procedens qui de providentiæ fonte descendens, cuncta suis locis & temporibusque disponit.

Prosa 2.

Manet autem liberum arbitrium neque enim fuerit ulla rationalis natura quin eidem libertas assit arbitrii.

Sed hanc non in omnibus æquam esse struo, natu superiis & divina substantia & perspicax judicium et imortuo-

ta, voluntas & efficax operatorum presto est potestas. In humanis vero animis libertas quidem esse necesse est cum se in mentis divinæ speculatione conservant, minus vero cum dilabuntur ad corpora, minusque etiam cum terrenis actibus colligantur, extrema vero est servitus cum vitiis deditus rationis propriæ possessione excideris.

PROSA 3.

Quid igitur quonam modo Deus hæc incerta futura prenoscit nam si inevitabiliter eventura censet quæ etiam non eventura possibile est, fallitur, quod non sentire modo nefas est sed etiam voce proferre. At si quemadmodum sint, ita ea futura esse decrevit, ut æque vel fieri ea vel non fieri possit cognoscat qua est hæc, præscientia, quæ nihil certum nihil stabile comprehendit. At quid hoc prefertur vaticinio illo Tythesiæ, ridicule *quicquid dicam aut erit aut non erit*, quid etiam Divinæ Providentiæ humanæ opinio prestiterit si veluti homines incerta judicat quorum est incertus eventus: Quod si apud illum rerum omnium certissimum fontem nihil incerti esse potest certus eorum est eventus quæ futura firmiter ille presscivit. Quare nulla est humanis consiliis actionibusque libertas quas Divina mens sine falsitatis errore cuncta perspiciens ad unum aligat ac constringit eventum, quo semel recepto quantus occasus humanarum rerum consequutus esse liquet: frustra enim bonis malisque præmia pœnæve proponuntur quas nullus meruit liber ac voluntarius motus animorum, idque enim videbitur iniquissimum quod nunc æquissimum judicatur vel punire improbos vel remunerare probos, nec vitia igitur nec virtutes quicquam in definiendo fuerint.

PROSA 4.

Quasi vero nos ea quæ Providentiæ futura esse prenoscit non esse eventura credamus, ac non illud potius arbitremur: Quod licet eveniant nihil tamen ut evenirent sua natura necessitatis

neceſſitatis habuiſſe, quod hinc facile perpendere licet: Plura etenim dum fiant ſubjecta oculis intuemur: ut ea quæ in quadrigis moderandis, atque flectendis facere ſpectantur aurigæ atque ad hunc modum certe aguntur, Nam igitur quicquam illorum ita fieri neceſſitas ulla compellit, fruſtra eſſet artis effectus ſi omnia coacte moverentur, quæ igitur cum fiunt carent exiſtendi neceſſitate eadem priuſquam fiunt ſine neceſſitate futura ſunt, quare ſunt quædam eventura quorum exitus ab omni neceſſitate ſint abſolutæ. Nam illud quidem nullum arbitror eſſe dicturum quod quæ nunc fiunt prius quam fierent eſſe eventura non fuerint, nam ſicut ſcientia præſentium rerum nihil iſtis ſit cum fiunt ita præſcientia futurorum nihil his quæ futura ſunt neceſſitatis importat.

Erroris cauſa eſt quod omnia quæ quiſque novit ex ipſorum vi atque natura cognoſci æſtimat quæ ſciuntur quod rationi contrarium eſt: omne enim quod cognoſcitur non ſecundum ſui vim ſed ſecundum cognoſcentium potius comprehenditur facultatem, nam ut hoc brevi liqueat exemplo eandem corporis rotunditatem aliter viſus, aliter tactus agnoſcit, ille eminus totum (ſcil.) jactis radiis intuetur hic vero cohærens orbi atque conjunctus circa ipſum motus ambitum rotunditatem partibus comprehendit, ipſum quoque hominem aliter ſenſus, aliter imaginatio, aliter ratio, aliter intelligentia contuetur, ſenſus figuram in ſubjecta materia conſtitutam, Imaginatio ſolam ſine materia judicat figuram, ratio hanc quoque tranſcendit, ſpeciemque ipſam quæ ſingularibus ineſt univerſali conſideratione perpendit: Intelligentiæ celſior oculus exiſtit, & ſupergreſſione facta univerſitatis ambitum & ipſam illam ſimplicem formam pura mentis acie contuetur.

Prosa 6.

Æternitas eſt, interminabilis vitæ tota ſimul & perfecta poſſeſſio.

Nota quod in verbo vitæ, omnia quæ ſunt ejus vitæ

comprehenduntur ſcilicet potentia, ſcientia, ſapientia, gaudium complacentia, &c.

Quid igitur poſtulas? ut neceſſaria fiant quæ divino lumine luſtrantur cum ne homines quidem neceſſaria faciant eſſe quæ videant. Num enim quæ preſentia cernis aliquam eis neceſſitatem addit intuitus, at qui ſi eſt divini humanique preſentis digna collatio ſicut vos hoc temporario preſenti quædam videtis ita ille divino ſuo æterne cerneret, ſed duæ ſunt neceſſitates, ſimplex una veluti quod neceſſe eſt omnes homines eſſe mortales: Altera conditionis ut ſi aliquem ambulare ſcies eum ambulare neceſſe ſit, quod quis novit id eſſe aliter ac notum eſt nequit.

Fiunt productio ne cuncta quæ futura Deus eſſe prenoſcit, ſed quædam de libero arbitrio ſunt, quæ quamvis eveniant exinde tamen naturam propriam non amittunt.

Commentariolum tuum Domine inquies lector uti ſit non video notæ quædam & ſcholi, tantum cernuntur. Imo Lector diſpoſitio & ordinatio ſententiarum Boethanarum naturam aliquid loco commentarii faciunt, magis enim ad ipſum Lectoris intellectum reddit Boethius. Ipſe ſed quoniam Commentariolum meum ita efflagitus, accipe ſuper hos verſus:

Tu triplicis mediam naturæ cuncta moventem,
Connectans animam per conſona membra reſolvis, &c.

Hos verſus & qui ſequntur ſic ſecundum mentem Boethianam interpretari licebit, & completa erit veritas eorum, anima hæc triplicis naturæ eſt anima Chriſti, Dei & hominis, media anima etiam eſt inter Deum & hominem, Deus ille erat cuncta movens ab æterno & tempus abævo movere jubebat, *per eum omnia ſunt facta quæ fuerunt facta & ſine eo nihil. Per conſona membra reſolvis &c.* Adaptaſti corpus animæ educta a Maria Virgine vi Spiritus Sancti & obumbrationem ejus Sanctum illud quod non vidit corruptionem internam vel externam Cabaliſtæ habent 7 Sepheroth primus eorum eſt Trinus: Intelligentia, Sapientia Energia ſeu amor activus: Sapientia eſt hic noſter

noſter perſona & media, filius intelligentiæ, a quibus ſpiritus ſeu amor activus, procedit.

Quæ dum ſecta duos motum glomeravit in orbes,
In ſemet reditura meat mentemque profundam
Circuit &c.

Secta, id eſt, inter divinam & humanam naturam nam in perfectione habet utramque & ratio tantum dividit inter ea & ſunt ratione tantum diviſa re nunquam. Non per mortem Chriſti licet anima humana vire a corpore per ſpatium trium dierum diviſa fuit.

In ſemet reditura meat &c. Circul non ſcil facit cõpletum in reflexione ſui ipſius, mentemque profundam Circuit, &c. id eſt dietatis, & quis hoc potuit niſi Chriſtus Jeſus, ſed Circulus hic internus & per reflexum mutuumque amorem & complacentiam eſt.

Et ſimili convertit imagine Cœlum ſimilima certe imagine circumgirat Cœlum vocatum Primum Mobile. Hæc interpretatio uti reor ſalva fide Catholica & orthodoxa eſt, & ex nulla parte inconveniens fieri poteſt.

Laus Deo Trino & Gloria in æternum.

Quæ addenda ſunt non erunt loco commentarii ſed ſuperſtructuræ quædam neceſſariæ, non ex naturæ & Philoſophiæ puteis ſed ex fonte limpidiſſimo ſcripturarum exhauſtæ.

Ipſe Boethius ut refert Author Commentarii in librum ſequentem Boethianum ex literatorum relationes de Trinitate quædam locutus erat quæ adjicienda eſſent libris de Conſolatione, ſed quoniam amiſſæ ſunt de eis nihil certum ſtatui poſſit.

Nos in ſuperſtructutis nunc operam impendamus & primo de altiore ſcientia non enim *intuitiva & inſtans* tantum eſt in deo ſcientia, ſed ut omniſciens eſt ita omnimodum habet, ſcientiam & *ex ſe & in ſe*.

Scientiam habet perſpectivam proſpiciens omnia, *videt enim omnia quæ fecerat & erant valde bona*, & hæc viſio proſpectiva erat *intuitiva* eſt interna ſcientia, *perſpectiva* autem rerum ad extra, deus enim recolligit proſpectum ad extra & eum ad internam, ideam ſive inſitam ſummi ſotmam boni reducit & in illla univerſali idea omnia perſpecta ad extra revocantur, hæc eſt vera & divina Philoſophia ſummeque metaphyſica.

Satis antea de malo & peccato dictum eſt, ſed de ira & exſcandeſcentia Dei parum aut nihil, de illis itaq; aliquid dicendum. Hæc autem eſt *vis & virtus punitaria* in Deo, ſed ſine paſſione & altercatione more humano Deus iraſci aut excandeſcere dicitur. Notandum etiam quod adeo obſtruſa & recondita ſunt hæc in natura Dei, eo quod nihil niſi peccatum hæc potuit educere; ipſe amor & bonitas nihil niſi amabile & bonum proferre potuit: malum hoc ergo ut ante dictum, *nihil* eſt eo quod qui *omnia poteſt* illud non poteſt facere, aliquid autem de malo conſiderandum ut antea, propter hoc quod juſtam vindictam Dei poſtulat; ſed de his ſatis, & nihil ſicut ſpero ſuperfluum,

Nunc de lapſu hominis aliquid dicendum per quod mors in mundum intravit, ſuper omnes homines & triumphavit pœnas infernales, & æternas introduxit.

De Redemptione etiam Chriſti Jeſu multa dicenda ſunt, & cognitu neceſſaria, amor enim ipſius humano generi jam lapſo exprimi non poteſt: non dico tamen, quamvis vere dici poteſt, fælix peccatum quod talem meruit Redemptorem, ſed potius infælix peccatum quod tale onus humeris ſuis impoſuit & quidem talis & tanti Redemptoris, qui crucem ligneam impoſitam humeris ipſius habuit, ſub qua ſuccubuit, non tale onus impoſuerunt milites multis gradibus excedat onus peccatorum quod ipſe Jeſus tulit, cum enim Simon crucem ligneam ejus onere vacuum, bajulabat, leviter præterit crux enim illa lignea vacua fuit oneris peccatorum, ſed ipſe Chriſtus, illud peccatorum onus & Torcular iræ & vindictæ ſummi D.i, ſolus ipſe tulit.

Mirabilis certè eſt ejus Incarnatio mirabilia ſua omnia quæ ſuſtinuit & fecit in carne, ſi dicturus eram; eorum numerus Caput & Caput meum; ſuper gredererur numerum citius ſtellarum indicarem aut arenas Maris numerarem omnia quæ fecerat Deus ille & Salvator Noſter ad gloriam & immortalitatem noſtram efficiunt, cujus nomini ſit Laus & Gloria in æternum: Sed obſervandum eſt quod licet Deus & homo fuerat Chriſtus ideoque ab omnibus adorandus, nunquam tamen quamdiu fuerat in terris proſtrationem tulit, in via ſtatus humiliationis ſuæ: Imo nec poſt reſurrectionem ejus admiſit Mariæ enim dixit quum eum adorare vellet, *Noli me tangere nondum enim aſcendi*; ultima pars ejus humiliationis erat in terris per quadraginta dies quieſcens mora.

Nunc autem venite exultemus Domino, jubilemus Deo Salvatori noſtro.

Veniamus ante faciem ejus gratias dantes & lætemur in eo cantantes Pſalmos.

Magnus enim eſt Deus noſter, & Rex magnus ſuper omnes Deos.

Venite adoremus & proſtramus & flectamus genua ante Dominum & refectorem noſtrum, quoniam miſericordia ejus extendit ſe uſque ad Cælum, & veritas ejus uſque ad nubes,

&

& aquas ſupra cœleſtes quæ univerſum circumgirant comminè enim eorum tendunt ad Centrum & cum non deſcendere permittuntur per primum Mobile ſe movent & ſecundum motum eorum movetur primum Mobile,

Mentemque profundam Circuit, &c.

Qualis eſt hic Circuitus, Internus certe, nam neque ipſe Deus Circuere ſeipſum poteſt, nam ſic extra ſe eſſet quod eſt impoſſibile & implicat contradictionem & Circuens erit major Circuito. Quanto minus poſſunt res Creatæ quæ non mentem profundam poſſunt Circuitu interno complecti. Sic enim Deo æquipararentur quod etiam foret impoſſibile. Abſit itaque quod quiſquam diceret mentem creatam aliquo modo poſſe mentem divinam Circuire: Thomas autem hoc dicit non ergo ſic explicatur Boethius ſed obſcuratur.

Nunc de æternitate Dei loquendum, ſciendum etiam eſt quod licet Deus ſit æternus, eſt etiam perpetuo durabili: *Qui eſt, qui erat, & qui venturus eſt*, quam ultimam particulam potius reddendum eſſe cenſeo per hæc verba qui *perpetuo eſt duraturus*, nam hæc verba *qui venturus* eſt aliquantu'um in æternitatem impingunt: Scientia etiam ejus perſpectum habet in duratione rerum, Reflexum etiam in ea quæ fuerunt. His premiſſis nunc de Deo ſalvatori noſtro u'terius dicendum, a quo ſola Beatio noſtra & fælicitas dependit. Ipſe confratres & cohæredes æternitatis nos ſecumveat, *Hic eſt veritas & vita*, Atque ita inquit Boethius noſter.

Te Cernere finis.
Principium Vector Dux ſemita terminus idem.

Quiſquis igitur fælicitatem vel precatur vel optat hunc ſequi ducem neceſſum, eſt ipſe enim eſt *Lumen illuminans* univerſumque, ipſe fons omnis bonitatis & beatitudinis, Ipſe Salvator & Redemptor qui ſuper mortem & Gehennam triumphavit, Ipſe preparavit nobis mantiones æternus in Cœlis, & in nova Jeruſalem, utque in facie ejus videbimus Deum ad vitam æternam,

Da

Da Pater Auguſtum mente conſcendere ſedem.
Da ſontem luſtrare bonis da luce reperta,
In te conſpicuos animi deſigere viſus.

Te Cernere finis.

Principium Vector, Dux, ſemita, terminus Idem.

Unum maxime notandum quod cum Salvator noſter eſſet ſapientia Patris, ſe tamen adeo humiliavit cum parvulis & infantibus commercium habere voluit & ulnis ſuis eos recepit & manus ſuas eis impoſuit & benedixit eis, & dixit *Sinite parvulos venire ad me nam illorum eſt regnum:* ſi illorum ſit regnum, illorum eſt Spiritus Sanctus, nam ſine Spiritu nemo intrat Regnum, ſi Spiritus illorum ſit, quare aquam baptiſmi iis denegetis? Quomodo aquam denegare poſſitis quum æque vobiſcum Spiritum Sanctum receperunt, O duri infantum ſoceri Anabaptiſtæ qui nec baptizare nec in baptiſmo Infantes permanere ſinitis ſed *copioſam illam redemptionem* rejicitis, & baptiſmum ejuratis Diabolus ab Auruſpicibus ſuis nihil magis requirit: Jam vero totum hoc opus fere expedivi, unicum tantum reſtat quod a Thoma exhaurias. & breviarum eſt quinque librorum ordine digeſtum quod & Latino & Anglico Sermone tenemus, & proculdubio optime ſonat ejus commentarium, & ſi nihil feciſſet ulterius perbelle a ſe factum eſſet.

Tu Provehis cauſis animos vitaſque minores.

Si qua vera Philoſophia ex his elicere poſſet prompte proferam ſi non Platonicam dimittam falſitatem, quæ apud eos raro evenit. Nam propemodum veraces ſunt Platonici & ex maxima parte vera loquuntur.

Tu provehis ſeu promoves cauſis animas vituſque minores, id eſt vegetativas & ſenſitivas, *rationales* excipe, & vere hæc ſonant.

Et Levibus ſublimes curribus optans,
in cælum terramque ſerio.

In hoc etiam nihil falſi reperio, ſed pro his quæ ſequuntur meam non poſſum dare ſententiam.

Quas lege benigna.

Ad te Converſus reduci facit igne reverti

Immortalitatem brutorum & Arborum vix patior immortalitati enim animarum humanarum præjudicat, licet autem falſum ſit nihil tamen inconvenientiæ ulterius ponit.

O qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas, &c.

O thou who with perpetuall reaſon govern'ſt
This world, Maker of Earth and Heaven for ever bleſt,
who doſt from aye make time proceed to all paſt motion,
Thy ſelf ſtil ſtanding firm, nat preſs'd with the devotion
Of outward cauſes to frame the flued matter
Of which Philoſophers ſo vainly chatter,
But by bleſt Ideal forme, no wayes envying,
Or that exact ſupernall ſamplar once denying,
In faireſt mind this fair world bearing,
And right unto the patterne it appearing.

Perfectaſque jubes perfectum abſolvere partes:
And doſt command the perfect to make perfect partes.

Tu numeris elementa ligas, ut frigora flammis
Arida conveniant liquidis nec purior ignis,
Evolet aut merſas, deducunt pondere terras.

The

The Elements with numbers thou doſt chaine,
That froſt with flames, dry things with moiſt may con-
Leſt the pure fire ſhould flee away, (cord claime,
Or earth ſubſide with its dull clay.

Tu triplicis mediam naturæ cuncta moventem,
&c.

Thou the triple nature of th'all-moving ſoul doſt bind,
Which being cut, her orbes doth with its motion twin'd,
Then doth it go into it ſelf, and Circle round
That moſt deep mind we rightly call profound,
And with like image turns the Heavens round.

Tu cauſis animas, &c.

Thou carryeſt on with cauſes the ſouls and leſſer lives.
Fitting the laſty with light Chariots, & thus ſhe drives,
And ſows in Earth & Heaven, and with a bleſſed Law
When they return thoſe lights, thou to thy ſelf doſt draw.

Da Pater Auguſtam menti conſcendere ſedem
&c.

Theſe Verſes are done to the mind of the Author by the Engliſh Tranſlator, wherefore for eaſe I will make uſe of them all but the laſt.

Dear Father let my mind thy glorious ſeat aſcend,
Let me behold the ſpring of grace, and find the light,
That I on that may fix my ſoules well cleered ſight,
Caſt off the earthly weight wherewith I am oppreſt,
Shine as thou art, moſt bright, thou only calm and reſt
To pious m n, whoſe end is to behold thy Ray,
Who art their firſt, Converſher, Guide their laſt, & way.

I will make use of the Translator in all that followeth in verse.

He that would seek the truth with thought profound,
And would not stray in ways which are not right,
He to himself must turn his inward sight,
And guide his motions in a circled round,
Teaching his minde what ever she designe
Her selfe in her own Treasure doth possesse;
So that which late lay hid in cloudiness,
More bright and cleer then Phœbus beams shall shine.
Flesh hath not quenched all the spirits light,
Though this oblivious lump holds her possest,
Some seed of truth remaineth in our brest,
Which skilfull Learning easily doth excite.
For being ask't, how can we answer true,
Unlesse that grace within our hearts did dwell,
If Plato's *heavenly Muse the truth doth tell,*
We learning things remember them anew?

Lib. 5. Met. 3.

What cause of discord breaks the bonds of love?
What God betwixt two truths such wars doth move,
That things which severally well setled be,
Yet joyn'd in one will never friendly prove,
Or in true things can we no discord see,
Because all certainties do still agree;
But our dull soule cover'd with members blind
Knows not the secret Law which things do bind,
By the drown'd light of her oppressed fire,
Why then the hidden Notes to find

Doth

Doth ſhe with ſuch a love of truth deſire,
If ſhe knows that which ſhe doth ſo require.
Why wiſheth ſhe known things to know again?
If ſhe knows not, why ſtrives ſhe with blind pain?
Who after things unknown will ſtrive to go?
Or will ſuch ignorant purſuit maintain?
How ſhall ſhe find them out? or having ſo,
How ſhall ſhe then their formes and natures know?
Or when this ſoul the higheſt mind did view,
Muſt we needs ſay, that it all natures knew?

Now ſhe, though clouds of fleſh do her debar,
Forgets not all that was her ancient due,
But in her mind ſome generall notions are,
Though not the skill of things particular.

He that ſeeks truth in neither courſe doth fall,
Not knowing all, nor ignorant of all;
He marketh gen'rall things which he retains,
And, matters ſeen on high, doth back recall,
And things forgotten to his mind regains,
And joyns them to that part that there remains.

Laurentius Valla Gramaticus vocat Boethium erudi-torum ultimum, non ordine aut gradu ſed tempore, tum enim Gothi & Vandali in Romanam ditionem irruptionem fece-runt cum Theodoricus erat Imperator, Boethius autem Romanorum eruditiſſimus ejus ætatis, vel a retro per mul-tos annos fuit ut opera ejus teſtantur.

Ancients in Schools once too obſcurely taught,
That ſence and ſhape preſented to the thought

From outward object, their impression take,
As when a paper ſmooth and plaine,
On which, as yet, the marks of ink hath layne,
We with a nimble pen do letters make.

But if our mind to nothing can apply
Their proper motions, but do patient lie
Subject to forms which do from bodies flow,
Like to a Glaſſe, rendring the ſhape of things;
Who then can ſhew from whence that motion ſpringes?
By force of which the minde all things doth know.
Or by what skill are ſeverall things eſpy'd?
And being known, what power doth them divide,
And thus divided doth again unite,
And with a various journey oft aſpires
To higheſt things, and oft again retires
To baſeſt, nothing being out of ſight.
And when ſhe back unto her ſelfe doth move,
Doth all the falſhoods by the truth reprove?
This vigour needs muſt be an active cauſe,
And with more powerfull forces muſt be deckt,
Then that which from theſe formes that do reflect
From outward matter all her vertue drawes,
And yet in living bodies paſſions might
Doth go before, whoſe office is to wait,
And the firſt motions in the minde do make,
As when the light unto our eyes appears,
Or ſome loud voyce is ſounded in our ears,
Then doth the ſtrength of the dull mind awake
Theſe phantaſies which ſhe retains within,
She ſtirreth up ſuch motions to begin,

Whoſe

whoſe obiects with their natures beſt agree;
And thus applying them to outward things,
She joynes th'externall ſhapes with thoſe ſhe brings,
With forms which in her ſelfe included bee.

THE

THE LIFE and DEATH OF *Anicius Manlius Torquatus Severinus Boethius.*

Taken out of *Peter Bertius*, and *Jul. Martianus Rota*.

Anicius Severinus Boethius was a Roman, one eminent both by the Nobility of his Ancestors, & the endowments of his soule. His life befell him in those times when *Italy* was held & oppressed by the Barbarians. For he was borne not long after *Rome* was taken by *Aleric*, and flourished in King *Theodoricks* time. This *Theodorick* being assisted by *Zeno* with many thousands, took to himself *Italy* after he had taken it away from *Odoacer*, and planted his Kingly seat at *Ravenna*, doing what ever him listed;

which *Boethius* well seeing, he applyed his mind to honest studies. Being therefore well skilled in Greek and Latine learning, he first translated something out of *Euclide*, and to them added some things of his owne. And that which was not found in *Aristotles* age, he taught to make a Square equall to a Circle. And hee rendred in Latine *Nichomacus* Arithmetick, not as a bare interpreter, but as one that knew how to do it in the best manner. Then Musick a most perplexed and inturned Art, was collected by him out of the best; in which he gave a full expression of *Aristoxenis* and *Pythagoras*. There is extant an Epistle of *Theodorick* to *Boethius*, which shews, that he translated into Latine both *Ptolomies Syntaxis*, and *Archymedes* his *Mechanick*. He shewes in his owne words that hee intended to translate *Aristotle*, what ever of *Aristotles* works shall come to my hands, I will turn them into the Roman stile and Language, Every little of them will I make to speak Latine, that what ever shall be of the subtilty of Logick of the Prudens of the morals & whatsoever is set down by *Aristotle* out of the quick ingeny of the Naturall, all that will I ordinately transfer and illustrate with a cleer light of Commentation.

He explained that Porphery whom *Cornelius Apher* after had translated in a compēdious manner, & illustrated the same with new Expositions. Assoon as he had put his hand to the Predicaments, behold he was made Consul of *Rome*; this he expresseth in his owne words. And although

though the cares of the Consular Office do hinder me, by which meanes I cannot imploy all my vacancies and my full industry in these studies, yet it seems to pertaine to some part of the care of the Common-wealth to instruct the Citizens in any elucubrate part of learning. Nor shall I deserve ill of my fellow Citizens, seeing the ancient vertue of men of the other Cities have transferred the Empire and Government to this only Common-wealth, I to that alone which is left may instruct the mode of our City in the Arts of the Greek Wisdome. Therefore this is not impertinent to the Consular Office, seeing it hath been alwaies the custome of *Rome*, that in what Nation soever that which was the most faire and excellent to make that more and more splendent by immitation. Thus he. But he came to be Consul a yong man, by the favour of the chiefe of the City, for they took the charge of him being a Boy, being they knew hee was from the ancient family of the *Manlii Torquati*, & saw the ingenuity of the *Anician* great Grandfather budding in him. In his first Consulate the King of the *Huns* and *Italy Odoacer*, by *Pheba* the Captain of the *Rugi*, hee was taken and possest and injoyed as *Cassiodore* relates, who names *Boethius* only but twice, Consull once with *Symachus*. And he not only obtain'd this honour, but his two sons, which had never before happened, he saw *Patricius* and *Hypatius* at the same time Consuls. That very year *Theodorick* being called to the Court at *Rome* in the name of *S. P. Q. R.*

Boethius made a Panegyrick with the highest eloquence in *Theodoricks* praise, betwixt the two Consuls, when he made a triumphall feast to the multitude.

In his last Consulate he had to collegue *Symachus* his Father in Law.

A sore famine oppressed *Campania*, and above all, a more bitter levy and exaction was demanded by the Tyrants Exactors, which this Consull would not suffer to be gathered.

Peter Bertius saith, there were divers who wrote upon the Books *de Consolatione*: to wit, of the more ancient *Albertus Magnus*, and *Tho. Aquinas*; after them *Rodolphus Agricola Frisius Joannes Murmellius, Ruremontanus, & nuper admodum Joannes Bernartius & Theodorus Zitzmannus.* This Booke was lately by mee read upon in my publick Lectures in the Academy. It appeares evidently that *Philip* the faire (the French King) did so highly esteem these Books, that though he well understood the Latine, yet hee tooke it as a benefit at the hands of *John Magdunensis* or *Mouns* the Poet, who dedicated to his Name his French Translation of it. This Booke was written in the Prison of *Ticinum*, where afterwards *Boethius* lost his head.

There were more *Boethiuses* then this one. One *Laertius* names, that was a Stoick. Another *Plutarch* names, who was an Epicurean. A third cited by *Galen*, a Cretian, a Studier of *Aristotle*, a Consular man. And our *Boethius* names a fourth in his Comment upon *Porphyry* anciently cited by

by *Amonicus* and *Symplicius*. A fifth was *Boethius* his own Father.

Our *Boethius* his firſt name is taken from the *Anicii*, the antiquitie and nobleneſs of whoſe name S. *Hierom* not in one place alone ſets forth. The moſt eminent of the *Anicii* was *Boethius* his great Grandfather, *Anicius Sextus Petronius Probus*, of whom there is frequent mention in *Amianus Marcellinus*, *Auſonius*, *Symachus*, and in the Code of *Theodoſian*, *Claudian* doubts not to prefer this *Aniſius* before all the Romans then living, for his Nobility.

Quemcunque requiris (inquit.)
Hæc de ſtirpe virum, certum eſt de conſule naſci
Per faſces numerantur Avi, ſemperque renata
Nobilitate virent, & prolem Fata ſequuntur,
Nec quiſquam procerum tentat licet ære vetuſto
Floreat, & claro cingatur Roma Senatu
Se jactare parem.

Quia Manlii gens Torquata erat eo factum eſt ut noſter Boethius dictus fuerat Torquatus.

But how our *Boethius* came to bee named *Severinus* it ſeems to bee doubtfull; ſome draw it from the ſeverity of the *Manlian* family, to which I cannot aſſent; for though I finde many of that family to have beene abundantly ſevere, yet I finde none of them to be named either *Severi* or *Severine*. Therefore I had rather aſcribe it to the name of the Family of the *Severines*. And

indeed there were many of that name and family Conſuls u der the Emperours *Leo* and *Zeno*. It may be *Manlia* the daughter of *Theodorus* was married to a *Severyne*, the Grandfather of our *Boethius*. Our *Boethius* was born the ſame yeare his Father was kill'd, to wit, the yeare of our Lord 455. I do not doubt but the *prænomen* or firſt name of *Boethius* was *Flavius*. For I finde in the Eccleſiaſtical acts theſe words *Fl. Boethii V.C. Conſule die* 3. *Iduum Martiarum in Baſilica Conſtantiana reſidente venerabili viro Papa Felice &c.* which words are to be referred to *Boethius* his firſt Conſulſhip. *Boethius* was borne the year of our Lord 455, *Boethius* beſtowed 11 yeares at *Athens*, that he beſtowed 11 years there, his Booke *de Diſciplina Scibolarium* confirms it.

The firſt Wife he married was *Elpis* a *Sicilian*, a noble Virgin, by whom he had two ſons, *Patricius* and *Hypatius*. Of her making it is believed the two Hymns *Aurea lux & fælix per omnia* were, which are now ſung in the Church.

The firſt Conſulat was the 487. year of Chriſt before *Theodorick* came to the Kingdom of *Italy* 2 years. His ſons *Patritius* and *Hypatius* were Conſuls 13 years after him, which was the year of our Lord 500. *Boethius* his ſecond Conſulat was the year of our Lord 510. of *Theodoricks* 18. He had a Library full fraught with Bookes of all Languages, whoſe wall ſhone with Ivory and glaſſe.

With this fulneſſe being inſtructed, *Boethius* did intend to illuſtrate all Philoſophy in the La-

tine

tine tongue, for thus he writes. For I turne every worke of *Ariſtotle* which ſhall come to my hand into the Roman Stile; will write out all of them in the Latine ſpeech; that whatſoever of his, either ſubtiltie of Logick, for the skill of morall gravity, or the ſhortneſſe of naturall verity, made tranſparent, by *Ariſtotle*, all that I will ordinately tranſfer and illuſtrate, with ſome kinde of light and commentary.

Theſe things hee with much labour in uniſall Philoſophy, did turne either out of the Greek, or himſelfe write in Latine.

In Logick theſe things.

To the Iſagoge of *Porpherie*, 2 bookes.
Of the ſecond Edition, one.
Upon the Categories of *Ariſtotle*, 2 bookes.
Upon the booke of *Peribermenias*, 1 booke.
Of the ſecond Edition, 6 bookes.
Of Diviſion, 1 booke.
Of Definitions, 1 booke.
Upon Categoricall Sylogiſmes, the Introduction, 1 booke.
Upon the Topicks of *Cicero*, 6 bookes.
Of Topicall Differences, 4 bookes.
Of the Categoricall Sylogiſms, 2 bookes.
Of the hypotheticall Sylogiſm, 2 bookes.
In the Retoricks. Of Retoricall places, 1 booke.
In Arithmetick, he tranſlated *Nichomacus* his Arithmeticke, *Caſſiodore* his Arithmeticke: this amongſt the Greeks *Nicomachus* did diligently expound

pound, whom first *Maudacensis Apuleius*, and then the magnificent man *Boethius* did give to the Romans translated in the Latin speech. Of Arithmeticke, two bookes.

In Musick he translated *Pythagoras* the Musitian: he writ of Musick 5 bookes.

In Geometrie he translated *Euclide*; *Cassiodore* speaking of Geometry, whose discipline he saith among the Greeks *Euclide*, *Apollonius*, *Archimedes*, and also other writers to bee observed who are extant, of which the magnificent man *Boethius* did give in the Roman tongue; who if he bee diligently read, that which of Divisions before said is apparent, shall bee knowne by manifest understanding and cleare truth.

He writ upon the Geometrie of *Euclide*, three bookes. Of the quadrature of the Circle.

In Geography and Astronomie hee translated *Ptolomeus Alexandrinus*

In the Mathematicks he translated *Archimedes* his Mecanicks.

Besides these hee put forth *Plato* turned by him. Epistles to diverse 1 booke.

Also he attempted the concord of the Philosophy of *Aristotle* with *Plato*.

Of weekes 1 booke.

I might believe even at Rome, that either extraordinarily he taught some noble yong men, or did oversee some others that taught them; did institute various exercises of all *sapientes* at his own house; for Rome was then excellent in all learning & Philosophy & humane discipline, as

may

may be ſeen out of the reſcript of *Theodorick* the King, to *Symachus*, *Boethius* his Father in Law, in which hee calls *Rome* the Mother of eloquence, and the large Church of all vertue, leſt the *Valrian* children that came from the *Syracuſan* City for the cauſe of ſtudy to *Rome*, without conſulting with him or his knowledge ſhould returne to their Father.

Boethius was very buſie in Tranſlations and writing Bookes when *Elpis* his deare Wife was taken away by death. A faithfull Companion of his cares, joyes, and ſtudies. Her Epitaph uncertaine whether written by *Boethius* or ſome other, ſuch as it is, is thus read.

Elpis dicta fuit Siculæ regionis alumna
Quem procul Patria conjugis egit amor
Quo ſine mæſta dies nox æra flebilis hora.

Porticibus ſacris jam nunc peregrina quieſco,
Judicis æterni teſtificata Virum.

Elpis being dead, *Boethius* married a ſecond Wife, *Raſticena* the daughter of *Symachus*, a Senator and Conſular man, by whom he had two ſons. After this comes *Boethius* his laſt Conſulat, which he bore with *Symachus* his Father in law, the year of our Lord 522. and of his owne age 67. Unto *Symachus* the Senators of new *Rome*, to *Boethius* the Senators of old *Rome*, gave the Conſulat. To this *Symachus Boethius* inſcribed a Book made by him of the holy Trinity, againſt *Neſto-*

zius and *Eutiches*. For *Boethius* was ſpecially ſtudied in Theology, and at that time the more diligent, becauſe he ſaw Orthodox ſentence of the holy Trinity to be oppoſed vehemently, by the Arrian Eaſtern *Gothes* and *Theodorick* their King; Therefore he wrote of the Unity of the Trinity, whether the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt doe predicate ſubſtantially of the Divinity. Moreover of the Faith to *John* the Deacon, of the two natures in Chriſt. But *Boethius* having put out thoſe Workes, did excite the hatred of *Theodorick* the King, and raiſed a ſuſpition in him, that he intended to change the Common-wealth to vindicate its liberty. Nor were there men wanting, who upon this occaſion did oppoſe openly upon this point, and did oppoſe openly his Conſular authority, to which *Boethius* enjoying a good conſcience valiantly oppoſed himſelfe, and was not afraid for the defending of the Common-wealth and private Citizens right to undertake the enmity of great men. Then hee repreſt *Conigaſtus* the exactor who invaded wickedly the fortunes of the miſerable Citizens. Nor did he that once only in his Conſulſhip, but often. After that *Triguilla* the Prefect, or Steward of the Kings houſe, he call'd back from his begun, and now almoſt perfected injury.

Boethius complained to *Theodorick* of the undoing of the Provinces by the rapines of the Prefects and publick Levies. In the famine of *Campania* and other intollerable exactions, by which it was almoſt ruin'd, hee for the common good

had

had a combate with the Prefect of the Pretorians, and the King himselfe knowing of it, hee contended vehemently for *Campania*, and by the force of his Oratory he effected the prohibition of that coemption.

These things being don by *Boethius* in the time of his Consulat when the hate of the King and his Courtiers were inflamed. The next year *Maximus* being Consul, hee was accused by *Basilius Opilius* and *Gaudentius*, men most flagitiously wicked, and (because of the Kings example, they followed the most impious tenent of *Arrius*) most bitterly against the Orthodox: Amongst these *Basilius* who had been discharged from the Kings service, being very much indebted in hope of the Kings favour he accused *Boethius*, but *Opilio* and *Gaudentius* who for many heinous crimes were destin'd to banishment, defended themselves by Sanctuary (although the King had made an edict, that if they departed not within their appointed day from *Ravenna*, they should be pul'd out from the Temple, they should be driven out with burnt marks in their forehead. Yet when they professed the accusation of *Boethius*, that very day designed for their Banishment, they were admitted, heard, and received into the Kings favour, and restored to their pristine dignity.

The sum of his accusation, or rather delation, was, because *Boethius* wished all well to the Senate and its Authority. That he opposed the Delator, lest hee should bring Instruments

by which hee ſhould prove the Senate guilty of high Treaſon. That he endeavcured the reſtitution of the Roman Empire, to the confirmation of which head, they produced Letters, as written by *Boethius*, when they were forged by themſelves. They ſaid alſo that *Boethius* through the ambition of dignity had polluted his conſcience with ſacriledge. *Theodorick* the King, who had before born himſelfe moderate to the Orthodox, from this very time began to be cruel; ſo that believing in ſuch feigned things, ſo that he condemned *Boethius* unguilty, than whom to him there was not another more beloved and lovely: and having declared all his Goods forfeit, hee ſent him to the Priſon of *Ticinum* (which the later men call *Papia*) 500 mile from the City.

In this Priſon (according to the example of *Socrates*) he firſt wrote a Booke an Apology and Defence; and there alſo hee wrote a Booke to *Symachus* of the Trinity. Hee did not perfect his worke *de Conſolatione*; for I have moſt certaine arguments by which I can evince, that the purpoſe of *Boethius* was to adde thoſe things out of the Chriſtian Doctrine, that the minde might be the moſt exalted in the conſideration of eternall life. And take it for laſt.

Himſelf propoſing theſe Philoſophical things, doth promiſe ſome other things more high and excellent than thoſe. Adde to theſe that which he ſaith in his 4. Book, he calls Philoſophy the paſſable way to true light, therefore he means not to make a full ſtop in that part, but to goe on.

on forward to the greater light. I had thought now to have ſtept from *Bertius*, and to have returned to *Martianus Rota*; but finding *Bertius* more punctuall and ſignificant in deſcribing the life of *Boethius*, I ſhall proceed with him firſt.

In the Priſon of *Ticinum* *Boethius* loſt his head the year of our Lord 526. of *Theodoricks* reigne 34. of his own life 71. The Citizens buried his body in S. *Peters* Church, under the golden Heaven in S. *Auguſtines* Chappel, where the aſcent begins.

His Epitaph.

Mæoniæ & Latiæ linguæ clariſſimus etqui
Conſul eram hic periī miſſus in exilium,
Sed quem mors rapuit probitas evexit ad auras,
Et nunc fama viget maxima, viget opus.

After his death *Amaliſuenta Theodoricks* daughter, the Mother of *Ahalerick*, the Widdow of *Eutharicus* erected all the *Satua's* of *Boethius* that were levelled in *Rome*, and reſtored to his Heires the whole patrimony. Alſo *Theodebate* the King to whom *Amaliſuenta* his ſiſter promored to the Crown as it is with *Caſſiodore l.* 10. *Epiſt.* 11. called one *Maximus* one of the *Anician* family to the dignity of the *Primiceriat*, and hee tooke a Wife of the Kingly ſtock.

To conclude 270 yeares after, to wit, in the yeare of our Lord 996. *Otho* the 3. *Auguſtus* took the bones out of the Sepulchre: in which thoſe of *Boethius* had layn hid, and removed them, and exalted them to a marble Tomb. In memory

of which act, *Gerbertus* is, that having abandoned the Arch Bishoprick of *Rhemes*, betook himselfe to the Bishoprick of *Ravenna*, and last of all was Pope of *Rome*, by the name of *Sylvester* the second, made this Verse at that time.

Roma potens dum jura sua declarat in orbe,
Tu Pater & Patriæ lumen Severine Boethi
Consulis officio rerum dispones habenas,
Infundis lumen studiis & cedere nescis
Græcorum ingeniis: sed mens divina coercet
Imperium mundi gladio bacchante Gothorum
Libertas Romana perit Tu Consul & exul
Insignes titulos præclara morte relinquis,
Nunc decus imperii summas qui prægravat artes,
Tertius Otho suum sua dignum te judicat aula,
Æternumque tui statuit monumenta laboris,
Et bene pro meritum meritis exornat honestis.

To the five Books *de Consolatione*, if a sixt had been added of eternall life, wee had had a consummate consolation against all the evils of this life.

I now come again to *Martianus Rota*. *Tycinum* was a City placed amongst the Insubrians, now Savoyards.

Boethius in writing his Books, consulted the best Authours, to wit, *Theophrastus, Eudemus, Andronicus, Asbasius, Herminius, Alexander, Syrianus, Porphyrius, Themistius*, of whose opinions, as an honorary Arbitrator, he gave his diciſion.

He himselfe attests this in his Exposition on *Aristotles*

Aristotles book *de Enuntiatione*, in the 3. of which books when on the manner of Contingents, hee there declares, that hee had written better of them in his Physicks. Thereupon hee gives us occasion to conjecture, that hee left also enucleations over naturall Philosophy.

But hitherto these Books are missing, though they have beene brought lately to *Tarvisium* as well as those which he wrote on the *Analyticks* and *Topicks*, seeing that he himselfe cytes these. And upon the *Topicks* of *Cicero* hee wrote seven Books, as himselfe professeth. He also takes upon him to Latinize *Plato's* Dialogues, that they were done, *Cassiodore* affirmes. I should wonder at the multitude and largenesse of these Workes, but that I know that those divine Commentaries upon *Aristotles* Book *de Interpretatione* was done by him in two years, which time would scarce serve to turne over so many Commentators as wrote upon it. For among the Peripatericks, there is scarce one famous that hath not written upon that Book: *Boethius* Commented upon this Book when *Theodorick* passed the *Alps*, and overthrew his Father in law *Clodoveus*, or *Lewis* the French King in a great battell. *Boethius* wrote *A* excellent Books of Topical differences, by which he differers the Logick from the Rhetorick, and as many more of both Sylogisms. Also of Division &c. on each 1. That which is the Introduction to the Categoricall Sylogisme is falsly inscribed with the Books of *Aristotle* of the Enunciation. For either it is a Breviary, as he calls it, (or certainly

tainly the ſame with the firſt upon the Categoricall Sylogiſm. And that Worke *de Diſciplina Scholarium*, belies not only the title, but alſo the elocution and invention. For *Boethius* would have written otherwiſe; but let that alone, and let us bring ſomwhat of his Weeks to light. The Work of the Weeks is diſtributed into 7 parts. *Varro* firſt wrote upon the Weeks, and then our Authour, out of which the little Booke of the good of ſubſtance, or ſubſtantiall good, and that other of the Unity, or One, are taken. He compoſed the Weeks a yong man, as alſo of that on the two Natures and one perſon of Chriſt. Upon the Commotions of the *Acephali* there was an handle or holdfaſt given to our *Boethius* to compoſe a Book againſt *Neſtorius*, who joyned to the two Natures as many perſons, and againſt *Eutiches*, who allowed but one Nature and one perſon.

The Inhabitants of *Tycinum* doe alwayes conſtantly aſſever this tradition from their Anceſtors, that our *Severyne* when hee was mortally wounded by the Kings Darter, to have carryed up his irraſed head with both hands, & being asked of whom he thought he was wounded? anſwered, by the impious, & ſo when he came into the neighbouring Church, and with bended knees had received the holy things of the Alter, expired preſently after. Being dead, he obtained Sainting honours amongſt ours, becauſe he ſuffered death becauſe hee maintained the Catholick Doctrines againſt the perfidies of the Arrians.

He

He had an Eulogy besides his Epitaph before recited, before he was quietly laid, by *Luitprandus* King of the *Lumbards*.

Ecce Boëthus adest in Cœlo magnus, & omni
Perspectus mundo, mirus habendus homo
Qui Theodorico Regi delatus iniquo
Ticini senium duxit in exilio,
In qua se mœstum solans dedit urbe libellum
Post ictus gladio exiit e medio.

I cannot omit what is said of *Symachus* the Colleague, and Father in Law of *Boethius*, of them two remembred by my present Authour *Marianus Rota*. There were two of the *Symachi* of great estimation for learning each of them; the first lived in *Gracian* and *Valerians*, the last in the times of *Zeno* and *Anastasius*; his Epistles are extant; and in esteem carried about by many, and he is often mentioned in *Macrobius* his *Saturnals*. Of this other there is nothing, but to pretermit the testimony of *Boethius*. *Priscian* of *Cæsarea* writing of weights, doth so commend him, that he doth appear thereby to have attained all the tops of all Disciplines.

And now I shall close all with *Rota's* Eulogy. This was the end of this excellent man, who for eloquence, honesty, and learning, did very much excell. The last of all the Romans who did consecrate any thing to literatures monuments; the first of all who did illustrate *Aristotle* in the Latine tongue. Of so great authority with poste-

rity, that there was almost no appeale from his sentences. By his death wee lost *Plato* and *Aristotles* Concordance, which hee promised, and had done, if not cut off by violent and immature death, and he only could do it.

But the revenge, or rather vengeance, stayed not long inflicted by Gods hand. For *Theodorick* supping when a fishes head was set before him, the King thought hee saw in that, *Symachus* his face biting his nether lip, and with fierce eies threatning; being struck with the spectacle, the Tyrane fell into a sickness, and assoon as hee confessed what he had seen, expired. His families divulged his death to be by a bloudy stroke. But *Amalasunta* knowing well the thing, when shee succeeded in the Kingdome, rescinds all her Fathers acts done against Law and right, and restored all *Severines* and *Symachus* his Goods to their children.

I Am glad to hear it from *Bellarmin* that *Aquinas* was not the Author of that unhappy Commentary that goes under his name upon *Boethius*. But sure that Commentator was ancient, for I have him printed above an hundred years since. I wish wee had the right *Aquinas* and *Albertus Magnus*; for these latter Commentators understand him not, and are meere Mountebancks; else I wish wee had *Bertius* his Lectures upon him.

I should bee glad that some man would finde out a convenient fence for those Verses of *Boethius*,

thius, if mine do not altogether pleaſe them; for I put no obligation upon any man to follow me.

Tu triplicis medium naturæ cuncta moVentem
Connectens Animam per Conſona membra reſolVis
Quæ dum ſecta duos motum glomeraVit in orbes,
In ſemet reditura meat mentemq́, profundam,
Circuit, &c.

And therefore I add this to my former interpretation and ſay, this *Circuitus mentis profundi ſive Divini*, may perhaps mean no more than the intuitive comprehenſion of the Ideal form in the mind of God, by which the Heavens are turned round. And this ſence is facile and eaſie, and then this *Anima triplicis naturæ & media*, may well be the ſoul of man, without any danger of error or blaſphemy. And the fooliſh opinion of *Anima mundi*, or *intelligentia movens orbem*, may be diſcarded and exploded.

Optime Southamptoniæ Princeps Regis Comes.

QVi sis fulcrum unicum Domus præclarissimæ adhuc Wryotheslianæ Southhamptoniæ; sed humiliter precor Deum Opt. Max. qui filium dedit Abrahæ tum fere mortuo, quod & ipse omnipotens filium tibi dabit ex charissima conjuge, ne extinctum in te sit nomen celebre Wryotheslianum defectu hæredis masculi. Perire autem nomen illud (licet sine prole masculo exeas) non finit & fama propria & patris excellentissimi, avique avorum tuorum præclarissimorum; hæc autem vocalis & aeria tantum fama, quam vellem tibi substantialem ex lumbis propriis superfuturam, claritatis & nominis continuationem, imo ut videas filios filiorum & pa-

cem & religionem, proscriptam interea hac nostra Anglicana, restitutam & adultam reflo-reſcentem. Ulteriores sunt mihi supplicationes quas loqui non licet, nec dum convenit, licebit autem posthac. Deo volente invocaque.

Namque dabit Deus his quoque finem.

Sed quanta est tibi mei cura, vir literatissime, & fame ut non finas Boethiana mea prelo mandari, sine circumspectione tua & judicio? Sed ve mihi, impressæ sunt aliquot schedæ ut mihi videtur, non bene excusæ. Et nisi ocius remittas mihi chartas meas male exaratas, opus finitum ante prius quam a te recipiam eas, quod dolenter dico. Sed hoc magnopere flagito, quod cum jam innotuit tibi ubi sit translatio illa optima (meæ tuæ optime dedicata) eam mihi celeri vectu mittas. Nam operi meo Boethiano ea translatio multum arridebit, & hoc a te vehementer peto. Vale Decus Angliæ. Ex ædibus Bostonianis 11 Octobris hora 12. nocturna 1654.

Tibi Deditissimus

S. E. M.

Errata.

IN the Title Page, line 4. read Anglo Latine. l. 6. r. S. E. M. Epiſtle p. 3. l. 8. S. E. M. Pa. 5. l. 11. r. ego. Pa. 2. 10. ſeſe per quædam. l. 11. receuperet. l. 24. ſibi nectere catenam. Pa 3. 13. humanos, r Boethio ut hæc. l. 14. videbantur. l. 18. read alike. Pa. 4. 1. *dele* omnes. l. 12. ultimo. l. 15. amorem, ſpem. l. 16. prepedita. l. 25. le. 8. Proſa. l. 30. Boethium promittit. l. 33. read after that which. Pa. 5. l. 4. Meeter. Pa. 6. 25. corpus beare. Pa. 7. 32. ad interitum tendunt. Pa. 9. 10. intuentes. Pa. 18. 18 nullum eſſe præmium. Pa. 19. 20. ducit. l. 34. ſame. Pa. 20. 1. ſæviunt. l. 3. Philoſophia. l. 4. magis compati uti facimus. l. 5. & 6. cupiunt ac. l. 12. ſi eorum vita. l. 15. declinant. l. 21. & 22. debent imitari. l. 23. ſapientiam. Pa. 21. 6. afflict ons. l. 7. their. l. 8. that it is. Pa. 23. 33. fatum. l. 34. mobilibus. ibid. omnia nectit. Pa. 27. 8. recreatus. l. 12. judicia. l. 30. remunerat. l. 31 ſententiæ. l. 32. contraria. l. 33. & 34. in tua. ibid. tandem. Pa. 28, 17, pro enim le. eſt l, 21, vertetis Pa 29, 6, acutiſſimis l, 8 lectum l, 17 adjicienda Pa. 30, 7 *dele* ipſi gregarius l, 8, pro effet le. ſit l, 9 pro cum le. ſi l, 14 *dele* inveniet Pa 37, 15 a me l, 16 conſulet l, 28 motum l, 31 ipſa Pa 28 11 vaniſſima l, 12 dicere velim l, 16 creatis Pa 29, 18 19 l, 25 meum ei præbere Pa 38, 6 certa Pa 40, 15 placeat l, 22 quas Pa 41, 3 eſt l, 10 carcers l, 16 providentiæ l, 30 ſupernis Pa 42, 6 exciderit Pa 44 16 ubi l, 17 ſcholiæ l, 19 aliquam l, 20 Boethium l, 24 connectens l, 32 eductum l, 33 per Pa 45, 9 anima humana ſeparata ibid. ſpatium l, 10 circulum.